The other consonant of this class, r, is certainly formed farther forward in the mouth than those of the fifth class.

The attempt to give another classification of consonants, into mutes, liquids, composites, sharp aspirates, and smooth aspirates, founded on "their several characteristics," shows most clearly that Mr. C. had no definite notions of the nature of the sounds of speech. What is the ground of these "characteristics ?" Is not a dental characteristically different from a labial? Why is not his first classification as much founded on "the several characteristics" of the consonants as the last? Doubtless a mute is to be distinguish ed from those consonants which Mr. C. denominates liquids. There is a most obvious distinction of consonants into vocals and non-vocals;* but that is a genuine distinction ap. plicable to all the elements, vowels as well as consonants. Besides, the first class of this division, as arranged by Mr. Chapin, the "mutes," are in no respect to be distinguished from the fourth, the "sharp aspirates." Forf and sh of the latter class are no more aspirated than s certainly of the first. Why, more. over, z and zh, or the element rep. resented by z in azure, should be placed in different classes, we can not conjecture. The definitions or specific descriptions of these divisions give us no aid in ascertaining the reason. Indeed, these definitions are wholly wanting in precis ion, if not in sense. What the author could have been thinking of when he defined liquids to be those elements "which have some vocal tone preceding their utterance," (!) we are at a loss to divine. And what idea can a boy get from the definition of the third class or com posites, which are said to be "those intermediate between the sound of

the liquid and mute, or, as some suppose, composed of both." A mute is defined to "have no vocal sound." A liquid has "some vocal tone preceding its utterance." A composite, being intermediate be tween a mute and a liquid, lies in that region, unknown to us, between 66 no vocal sound" and "a vocal tone," or, as some suppose," is composed of both, i. e. of vocality and non-vocality!

But it is worse than idle to pursue this examination of Mr. C.'s principles of phonology farther. Enough has been said to show that he knew little of what he was writing. Let not the condemnation of ignorance be however too harshly pronounced. Like absurdities and nonsense may be detected in many so called sys tems of articulation. May not similar defects be discovered in the in cipient and immature developments of almost every science? We had supposed, however, that the science of phonology was nearer maturity than Mr. C.'s work would indicate. There are works indeed which have avoided these blunders. But, unhappily, philologists have overlooked too much this fundamental branch of their science, and have left it to be cultivated by other hands.

With such a basis to stand upon, it is apparent that Mr. C.'s whole system of orthoepy must be unsta ble and unworthy of any confidence. He knows not the value of his digits; and however accurate his knowledge of the rule of multipli cation, and however correct his ap plication of it, his products are uncertain, and without value.

Although sufficient may have al ready been said to show how dan gerous to the interests of a pure or thoepy, it would be to introduce this work into our elementary schools, still, it may not be amiss in order to indicate its scientific value more fully, to extend our examination into Mr. C.'s doctrines of syllabication. We are sorry to find the same loose

ness and negligence here that have troubled us hitherto. His definitions are wholly wanting in philosophical precision, and consequently, if strict ly interpreted, are untrue. We find, in part, the errors of his phonology introduced here, and, in part, his principles there rejected, here. For a single example, o in go, which had before been called an intermediate vowel sound, is here a simple vowel sound. His deductions from these definitions and principles, are of course, inaccurate and uncertain. We shall only instance a few of them; not because there are not many more, but simply because these will answer our purpose. "From these principles," he says, p. 155, "it follows that simple syllables ending with vowels, always have their vowels long; but ending with a consonant or consonants, always have their vowels short.' A simple syllable he had before defined to be one that "has but one simple vowel sound." To say nothing of the ambiguity with which the words "long" and "short" are here and elsewhere used, sometimes denoting mere quantity, sometimes indicating the kind of vowel sound, both of the particular assertions contained in the remark above quoted, are untrue. In the first place, there is a multitude of words in the English language in which "simple syllables ending with vowels" are short. The i, thus, is short in such words as chariot, scrutiny, attitude. In the next place, simple syllables 'ending with a consonant or consonants," do not " always have their vowels short;" as portion, danger, moonstruck, poorness, artist, wanting.

*

Of the particular rules which

*We sometimes say, thus, that the a is long in war and short in quality, referring to the quantity merely of the vowel. We say, also, that a has its long sound in alias and its short sound in alibi, when we speak of the nature or kind of the vowel sound.

are given "for pronouncing vowel letters," "for representing vowel sounds," "for unaccented vowel sounds," "for representing consonant sounds," "for division of words," some appear to us to be correct, and some incorrect. As a system of rules, they show a want of skill in discriminating among the proper sounds of the letters, and a haste in generalizing. It would be tedious to examine them one by one. most that we can say of any particular rule, is, it may be correct, it may be incorrect: the reader must satisfy himself by actual investigation.

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In other words, the rules are not a trustworthy guide to correct pronunciation. Many of the modes of pronouncing particular words, on which sometimes his rule is in part founded, we regard as discordant with correct usage, and to adopt them would justly subject one to the charge of vulgarity. It is for this reason, mainly, that we should deprecate the use of the book in our elementary schools. The "rules and reasons,' even if committed to memory, so far as erroneous, might be corrected in riper years. The habits of pronouncing single words formed when young, would be like. ly to remain through life, with but partial correction from observation of accurate use.

*Such are merry and other words of that class in which, on pp. 74 and 155, the e is said to have the sound of the " long and slender" a as in fate, but on p. 159, the sound of a in care, both incorrectly; spirit pronounced sperit; yes, as if yis; early, &c. the ea as in heary; haunch, &c. the au like a in care; draught as if draut; and a multitude of others. Some of these errors evince want of observation of best usage; others an undiscriminating ear. Few pages in the book where orthoepy is treated of, are free from such blunders. An inability to distinguish the sound of the vowel in the last syllable in such words as breakfast, trespass, balance, giant, and successive pages of similar words, from the short u sound in but, evinces the want of an essential qualifi cation for writing a work on pronunciation.

We discover the same want of accuracy and of systematic investigation in handling the principles of accentuation. To say nothing of his definition of accent, which we consider to be defective, as giving but one of the elements of accent, we are sure that many of his rules are incorrect. Certainly subjugate, as well as many other words of three syllables, must be regarded as having more than one accent. "All proper compounds" in two syllables, further, do not "accent the first syllable," as beef-steak; nor do all "words derived by prefixes" in two syllables accent the last, as upland, upstart. It is not true that all "trisyllables accent the antepenult" in words ending the penult with a vowel, as creation; nor that such as end the second syllable with a consonant always accent the penult, even allowing for the exceptions that are given, as clownishness, amnesty. Indeed, not one of the rules given by Mr. C. for the accentuation of words will apply in all cases, as he has asserted. The exceptions, which he has omitted to give, are so numerous as to render the rules unsafe guides in practice. They are additional instances of that hasty generalization and misapprehension of the true principle applicable to the case in hand, which give character to the whole work.

In his "summary of principles" deduced from the "analysis," Mr. C. has omitted to give any "rules and reasons" for the orthography of the language. In this part of his work, we are inclined to think he would have succeeded better than in any other; we, therefore, regret the omission. Still we must apprehend errors would have crept in, so many and so capital as to injure much the value of his book as a practical guide. At least this must be our apprehension if we are to take as a specimen of his skill the only general rule which we now recollect to have noticed. It is in a

note on page 64, where he says, "words which end in eur in the French, ore in the Italian, and ors in the Provençal, should have our in English." He had just above said, "abstract nouns, or words denoting names of qualities, have our instead of or; but not names of things; except the word Saviour." * These two rules, we suppose, are intended to cover in part, at least, the same ground. His tables, on the same page, are inconsistent with both. Stupor, terror, languor, sapor, thus, are spelt, contrary to his rules, although correctly, without the u; while succor, horror, flavor, are in correctly spelt with our. We con fess ourselves unable on Mr. C.'s principles to perceive the ground of the distinction.

The title-page of the book gave no promise of any etymological in vestigation; and the many pages de voted to this subject are a work of supererogation, except so far as the principles of derivation affect those of orthoepy and orthography. Yet these pages are the most valuable part of the book. The subject is indeed imperfectly treated. We think the author has failed to seize the principle of classification that will give clearness to this intricate subject. But he has the merit of having advanced farther in the ac tual classification of words accord. ing to their roots, than any preced ing writer with whom we are acquainted. We are sorry to meet here with the faults that we have detected in other parts of the book. We note only the following instan ces of error, as being sufficient to justify our remark, and to show how far the work may be depend ed on as authority in matters of etymology. The rule for forming plurals on p. 170, is inaccurate. The plural of solo is not soloes, as

*He adds, that Saviour "is the name both of a person and a quality." Where, in the English language, is "Saviour" the name of a quality?

intuitive truths are of all propositions most certain, clear, and stable, the best way, and in many instances the shortest way of establishing a disputed proposition, is by introducing it as a squatter upon the domain of " pure reason," till by preemption or some other process it acquires a legal settlement and freehold in the category of intuitive truths. Thus in the controversy about "fate" and "free will," which has exercised the wits of metaphysicians in this apostate world for some thousands of years, and which the great poet tells us baffled the mightier powers of fallen angels ere this world was created,-the fatalist or necessitarian on the one side, and the free-willer on the other side, are insisting, and have been for centuries, each that his own dogma on that subject is not only true, but intuitively true-so true as to be unconsciously and necessarily assumed in all reasoning upon human actions-so palpably true that no man can doubt it without showing marks of insanity or idiocy, and none can gainsay it without contradicting his own words and thoughts, giving the lie to his own consciousness, and denying the very elements not only of all knowledge, but of his own intellectual and moral nature. The philosopher of the one party, when he makes out his catalogue of intuitive truths, gives a high place to the truth that in every act of choice there was in the chooser a full power to the contrary choice, a power which in the same circumstances, and under precisely the same influences objective and subjective, might have chosen the other way. "The man that does not know this," quoth he, "does not know any thing; you can not begin to reason with him ;— put him into Bedlam." On the other hand, the philosopher of the opposite party, with equal confidence, assumes it, and insists upon it, as a constitutional cognition of the mind, an element in all reasoning upon

human actions, that choice is in every instance determined by motives; and that, the state of mind immediately antecedent remaining the same, the choice could not be other than it was. He does not prove this-and indeed how can he?

otherwise than by taking it for granted, and showing that he who denies it is a numskull and has no right to believe any thing.

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There are many important dog. mas going up and down in the world that have but scanty prospects of obtaining permanently and general ly the credit and authority demanded for them, unless they can in some way obtain a settlement among intuitive truths. We can not speak particularly of the many dogmas, political, critical, historical, which, though they are of the greatest im portance in the systems of thought to which they belong, are so inca pable of proof that they must ultimately be rejected and cast out as fallacies, unless they can be adopted into this privileged category; but we may put in a word in behalf of the great doctrine of apostolical suc cession. We suggest the question to the asserters of that doctrine, whether it would not be wise to make a bold push at once, and get rid of the troublesome demands for proof so pertinaciously urged on the part of "dissenters," by enroll ing their great first principle among the independent and eternal verities of the "pure reason." Certainly this great dogma has one at least of the most striking characteristics of the truths commonly called intui tive;-it can not be proved by any argument into which it does not it self enter as an element. It is so essential to the entire system of thought with which it stands connected, that every attempt to prove it, which has any appearance plausibility, is found upon analysis to involve as an inseparable princi ple of the argument an assumption of the very thing to be proved. If

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