Dissertations and Discussions: Political, Philosophical, and Historical, Том 3H. Holt, 1874 |
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action admitted appears Assembly asserted Athenian Athens Bentham Cairnes capable character civilized common condition conduct consequences consider Constitution cultivation democracy Deontology desire despotism doctrine duty England equally ethical evil exist expediency fact faculties favor feeling foreign France freedom French give Grecian Greece Grote happiness human idea improvement individual influence injustice institutions interest justice Lamartine legislation liberty Lord Brougham Louis Blanc Louis Philippe mankind means ment mind mode moral philosophy moral rules nation nature never object obligation oligarchical opinion pain party Pericles person philosophy Plato pleasure political popular practical present principle of utility produce profess Provisional Government punishment question reason regard Revolution selfish sense sentiment Slave Power slavery social society Socrates Sparta standard supposed sympathy theory Theramenes thing thought Thucydides tion truth unjust utilitarian virtue Whewell Whewell's whole women writers wrong
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Сторінка 312 - It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.
Сторінка 308 - The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.
Сторінка 323 - As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as you would be done by, and to love your neighbour as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.
Сторінка 315 - According to the greatest happiness principle, as above explained, the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable — whether we are considering our own good or that of other people — is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality...
Сторінка 311 - Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures ; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs.
Сторінка 165 - What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog, is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer...
Сторінка 310 - But there is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation.
Сторінка 374 - To recapitulate: the idea of justice supposes two things— a rule of conduct and a sentiment which sanctions the rule. The first must be supposed common to all mankind and intended for their good. The other (the sentiment) is a desire that punishment may be suffered by those who infringe the rule.
Сторінка 325 - He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty or the hope of being paid for his trouble; he who betrays the friend that trusts him is guilty of a crime, even if his object be to serve another friend to whom he is under greater obligations.
Сторінка 314 - ... addict themselves to inferior pleasures, not because they deliberately prefer them, but because they are either the only ones to which they have access, or the only ones which they are any longer capable of enjoying.