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AN AMERICAN CONCERT OF THE POWERS

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By Theodore S. Woolsey

HE Equality of States; rather a dull, repellent, not to say commonplace, topic is this, one says to himself. True, but so are the Ten Commandments. It is the breach of them that lends interest to them. If every state in the family of nations recognized and respected the central fact upon which political society is founded that every other state is its own equal in the possession of rights, and must be let alone in the exercise of those rights-then truly our lines would be cast in pleasant places for the millennium would have arrived.

Let us illustrate the difference between theory and practice in the working out of this doctrine of state equality in certain of its aspects.

For two generations the states of the European continent have been divisible into two general classes: those which are respectable members of society and those which are not. The former pay their debts or at least the interest on them; are strong enough to command respect; are stable enough to encourage development; are wise enough to recognize common interests, such as the value of tranquillity; in short, are powers. The latter are out side of this charmed circle. They are in no combinations; they play the political game single-handed; they fish in troubled waters and, it may be, trouble the waters in order to fish; through ignorance or shiftlessness or policy they misgovern their subjects; they owe more than they can pay; they lack credit, stability, character, but they do not lack astuteness. Now if the equality of states were a fact, if independence or the right to be let alone were complete, such states would be allowed to misgovern and to lag behind in civilization uncontrolled.

This is not always permitted them, however. They feel the power of combirations of states of the former class exercised to keep them in the straight and narrow way and duly resent the press

ure. Their one idea of statecraft is to break up such combinations by playing upon mutual jealousies, by playing off one state against another. And so we have a picture of modern Europe. Amidst the greater themes runs ever this minor chord in the European concert. The Concert of the Powers constraining Turkey and Greece and the Danubian peoples to be good and quiet, and calling their action "police power," is a familiar spectacle. Who gave them this power over their equals? They took it, and said it was in self-defence.

It may be here remarked that the very ancient principle of the balance of power, that is, the principle that if one of a group of states grows so strong as to endanger another all the rest shall combine to reduce the first to harmlessness, was also a denial of state equality and based on the same need of self-defence. The balance of power principle in one shape or another survived until the decade 18601870. That period saw Germany growing united and strong and finally predominant, but with no combination against her. And since then there seems to have sprung up in place of the balance of power principle a system of alliances to hold the big states in check, and the police power idea to restrain the little ones.

To avoid the appearance of vagueness let us take a single illustration of this police power and its application. Greece was a victim of Turkey's misrule. With the aid of the Powers she got her independence and passed under their tutelage. Many vicissitudes she met with, but in process of time at the Berlin Congress, like other states, fattened a little at the expense of Turkey. Unfortunately the increase of territory proved a mere paper promise. So in 1897, to call attention to her wrongs and her claims, following time-honored usage, Greece began to agitate. She aided the Christian insurgents in Crete and raided over the border in Epirus and Macedonia. Nat

urally war with Turkey resulted, and the progress. Still, progress there has been warlike Ottomans speedily mastered by whatever standard you test it: by Thessaly. Then the Powers interfered. stability, by credit, by growth in wealth, At the outset Salisbury, as the mouth- by institutional development, even by piece of the Concert, had plainly said, constitutional control. "The Powers being firmly resolved to maintain the general peace, have decided not to permit the aggressor in any case to reap the least advantage from such aggression." He added further, "It is impossible that Europe should allow Christian communities to fall under the Sultan's government. But it must not be supposed, because this doctrine throws its ægis over Greece, that therefore she is to be free from all penalties attaching to unwise or unrighteous action." Thus when the moment for intervention came, Turkey was whipped off, and Greece, in a chastened spirit after her thrashing, was set going again with but trivial loss as the result of her adventure. There was no more real equality between these states than there is between the three actors in a barnyard drama when I set my dog on my cow to drive her out of my garden. Nevertheless there is plenty of reason to believe that the excuse for this abnormal exercise of control, namely, that it is done in behalf of the peace of Europe, is a good excuse and a real reason. It is to be borne constantly in mind, however, that this police power is wielded by all the leading powers of the European continent, with the sole exception of Turkey, not necessarily bound by treaty but acting unitedly because their interests are identical, and at the back of all these interests is fearfear lest a spark not stamped promptly out may lead to a general conflagration. Turn now to our own hemisphere.

To the casual and prejudiced observer it may be that the Latin-American states look alike. This is not the opinion of those who have sympathetically studied our neighbors. As in Europe, there are good states and bad states. There are Mexico and Brazil, Chile, Peru and the Argentine, as well as Venezuela, Cuba, Santo-Domingo, Hayti and Salvador. It is true that popular opinion and the people's will do not always find as free expression as one could wish. The beneficent despot rather than the constitutional executive has been the instrument of

VOL. XLV.-39

Yet alongside of this brighter picture is a long, dark vista of dictatorships and revolutions, of broken contracts and repudiation, of life and property insecure. In one particular the American differs from the European situation, for here there is no such danger of a general embroilment. The police power, if applied at all to the ill-behaved states, must be justified by the needs of civilization, not of self-defence. Whether such interference in the affairs of another state, based upon such a motive, is justifiable, each person must judge for himself. That President Roosevelt believes in it seems evident from his message to Congress of December 6, 1904. "Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows decency and efficiency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrong-doing, as an influence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America as elsewhere ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and, in the Western Hemisphere, the adherence of the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or impotence to the exercise of an international police power." And I would point out that both European powers and the United States have repeatedly assumed this right. France in Mexico, Peru and Buenos Ayres; the United States in Cuba, Santo-Domingo, and Venezuela; Great Britain in Nicaragua, Venezuela and Buenos Ayres; Spain in Peru and Chile, are cases in point. Examples of this action, big and little, justifiable and hard to justify, successful and failures, are many. Certainly if the application of an international police power in Europe is lawful, its proper use on other continents must be equally lawful. Here belongs what is called in modern political phrase, the policy of the "big stick" as if it were a policeman's truncheon. To meet this growing readiness

violently to interfere in their affairs on pecuniary grounds, the South American states have invented a contrary principle which they call from its sponsors the Calvo or (in a milder form) the Drago Doctrine, forbidding the collection by force of contract debts claimed by one country as due its citizens by another. This was considered and agreed to by the Second Hague Conference. But the prohibition does not hold if the debtor state refuses to submit the question of liability to arbitration or if after losing in arbitration it fails to pay the award. Thus by implication the abstract right of interference is approved.

Somewhat akin to this exercise of police power is another claim which the United States alone asserts, to concern itself with its fellow American states in their defence, for it assumes to prevent full punishment of their wrong-doing. This is the Monroe Doctrine in its modern shape, the doctrine that though a European state may punish an American state for misdemeanor, may declare war upon it even, yet punishment must not result in permanent seizure of its territory. Curiously enough the United States bases such action so far as it is aimed at European powers upon the right of self-defence. President Cleveland, for instance, in his Venezuela message of December 17, 1895, says that his enforcement of this Monroe Doctrine against Great Britain "is important to our peace and safety as a nation and is essential to the integrity of our free institutions" . . . and earlier in the same month he had told Congress that "the traditional and established policy of this Government is firmly opposed to a forcible increase by any European power of its territorial possessions on this continent." Thus upon this Western continent are a variety of states with whose political fortunes our own are in this way linked and with whose commercial development we desire to be identified. But such altruism is not always appreciated. For, owing to similarity of race, speech and situation, when we interfere -as in behalf of Cuba-all the other Latin-American communities incline to suspect the integrity of our motives. This is true if the "big stick" is brandished; it is true if the Monroe Doctrine is en

forced; it is true if we intervene in behalf of humanity or to advance the interests of civilization. Whatever we do single handed will be mistrusted. It is as if Great Britain should undertake to tranquilize South-Eastern Europe without consulting Austria and Germany and Russia.

There is another aspect of single-handed action: if the United States attempts alone to control the destinies of the minor states on this continent. It presupposes a power which it does not possess, as well as a responsibility which it cannot afford to assume. Even to redress our own wrongs, we cannot get at Venezuela behind her mountain rampart, for instance.

To march an army and to supply it, over the route which leads from the sea to Caracas is an impracticable thing and President Castro is well aware of it.

Thus we assume, under the modern broadly expanded Monroe Doctrine, to forbid foreign aggressive action against Venezuela to the extent of seizing territory, yet have no means of curbing Venezuela in her aggression upon the rights of other powers, even of ourselves.

Exactly what degree of responsibility can be attached to the United States for the misbehavior of a state like Venezuela it is difficult to say. Of course our own official attitude is to deny any responsibility at all. And yet it is open to argument whether this assumption of power without corresponding responsibility is not inconsistent with the principles of reason, of justice and of law. In this connection let me cite certain remarks of Secretary Root before the New England Society in 1904, speaking on a corollary of the Monroe Doctrine, as given in the next day's papers:

"And if we are to maintain this doctrine which is vital to our national life and safety, at the same time when we say to the other powers of the world: You shall not push your remedies for wrongs against these republics to the point of occupying their territory, we are bound to say that whenever the wrong cannot be otherwise redressed we ourselves will see that it is redressed."

To protect another from the consequences of his act, yet not to have con

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"You shall not have a free hand with my weaker brethren," says Uncle Sam to his European friends; "because it would be dangerous to my peace and safety and to the integrity of my institutions."

What wonder that European statesmen reply: "If you will not permit us to redress our own wrongs, then we shall look to you as the 'best friend' of the wrongdoer for compensation." Can one avoid the conviction that there is an element of justice in such complaint and in such demand? Is it not at least true that it is peculiarly to our interest to have wellbehaved rather than ill-behaved states as our neighbors?

There are two ways of dealing with an offender: You may try to prevent his act, or you may punish his act. If the United States has any degree of responsibility for the conduct of its fellow states in this hemisphere; if, at least, it is peculiarly interested in that conduct, and if it cannot readily punish it without assuming an intolerable burden, the alternative treatment-prevention-suggests itself.

To prevent a wrong you must know that such wrong is imminent and moreover you must have power. To prevent Venezuela, for example, from violation of contract, repudiation of debt, perversion of the form of justice, you must have an astute observer on the spot and such control of party government as will hold an aggressive executive in check ordinarily. But see what this involves: The agent of the United States at the less trustworthy American capitals must become the centre of a web of intrigue. With money and influence he must build up a party in each which will do his bidding positively or negatively, to take action or to prevent action. As a last resort he must be ready to meet aggression with revolution. I do not think this rather shocking picture is overdrawn.

The opera bouffe of the novelist might well become the reality of the statesman. And little argument is needed to show that our straightforward type of diplomacy would be unequal to such a task.

In what has been said hitherto we have contemplated action taken by our country as a single and separate state. If the argument advanced carries conviction it shows that such action is impracticable, hard to justify, embarrassing, unwise. Its harvest, as our experience shows, is dislike, not gratitude. And is this not natural, for it is a consciousness of superiority that dictates it? But there is an alternative. It is to suggest this better plan that these lines are written. Why cannot the idea of a concert of powers, working unitedly to keep the peace, to advance our civilization, to foster our trade, to protect, to regulate, even to punish, be translated to these Western shores-an American police power in the hands of all the stable, responsible and orderly states of this hemisphere?

Several facts are leading up to this idea. One is the formation of the International Union of American Republics as a result of the Pan-American Congress of 1889, to emphasize and foster the solidarity of American interests. Reciprocal arbitration agreements have been entered into, mutual knowledge has been gained, the first step has been taken toward the habit of acting together. Of this the Bureau of American Republics at Washington, with its machinery for getting and diffusing information, is a constant reminder.

Another influence tending strongly in the same direction is that memorable journey to the South American capitals by Secretary Root two years ago, at the time of the third international conference of the American republics in Rio de Janeiro.

His statesmanlike grasp of the possibilities of the situation, his sympathetic understanding of the Latin-American character, his tactful speech and friendly manner have done much to pave the way for the policy here advocated.

In the joint action by the United States and Mexico in 1906 to induce

three Central American states, Honduras, San Salvador and Guatemala, to keep the peace, resulting in what has been called the Peace of Marblehead, because that ship served as neutral ground for deliberation, we see the actual introduction of the principal under discussion, a union. of American powers to apply restraint (i. e., the police power) to certain of their fellows.

This joint action was followed the next year by Mr. Root's visit to Mexico, thus completing his informative journeys to our neighbor states.

In the light of the various facts here recalled, is it too much to say that a Concert of Powers in America is actually in process of formation; that its influence in keeping the peace has already been exercised and that the machinery for its working already exists?

Do not cherish the belief that such a concert will introduce the millenium. Within its membership as well as outside of it, will be suspicion and jealousies and disagreement, perhaps even war. It is always possible, as in Europe, that a general agreement may give place to a general conflict. But in two particulars it is reasonable to think that such joint action would be more generally practicable and

peaceable than the single-handed action of one State no matter how powerful:

1. If many states unite to curb one, it means peace. One state cannot afford to fight or to flout all its neighbors, for that means isolation.

2. If the strongest American state loyally unites itself with the other "good" states, the members of this concert, at least, will have mutual respect and goodwill, which can be translated into terms of mutual and profitable trade.

Unity of action too strong to be opposed; peace as a result instead of revolution and war; the dictator at a discount, since no one will recognize him; political friendship and commercial sympathy instead of suspicion and jealousy; a premium set on stability and solvency, since to be in the concert rather than outside of it would mean so much to the minor states, would be so well worth while; a trade mutually profitable based on mutual good-will; an influence larger in world. policies than any one state could aspire to. Such results as these, even if not realized, are at least worth aiming at. Are they not more profitable if the United States joins hands with its fellows on this continent, than they could be if it plays the game alone?

AT PARTING

By C. A. Price

HAVE we not known most happy life?
Thou sayest, my Very Dear.
Vex not the end with useless strife.
Alas! the end so near!

Hath not Love given us of his store?

Yez, measure heaped, each day.

Whom Love hath filled fears Death no more.

My heart I cannot say—

Lo, I am gone where Time is not,

Being in Love's release;

Find in thy heart that dateless spot,

And it shall answer: Peace.

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