vulfion ; the agitation continued after the action, and was carried to excefs by the religious quarrels that arose at that time.

CHAP. VIII.

Tiew Restrictions.

THE Commons, however, have not entirely relied on the advantages of the great prero-gative with which the Conftitution has intrusted them.

Though this prerogative is, in a manner, out of danger of an immediate attack, they have nevertheless fhewn at all times the greatest jealousy on its account. They never fuffer, as we have obferved before, a money-bill to begin any where but with themselves; and any alteration that may be made in it, in the other Houfe, is fure to be rejected. If the Commons had not most strictly referved to themselves the exercife of a prerogative on which their very exiftence depends, the whole might at length have flidden into that other body, which they might have fuffered to fhare in it equally with them. If any other perfons, befides Reprefentatives of the People, had a right to make an offer of the produce of the labour of the people,

the

G 2

people, the executive Power would foon have forgot, that it only exifts for the advantage of the public *.

Befides,

As the Crown had the undisputed prerogative of assenting to, and diffenting from, what bills it thinks proper, as well as of convening, proroguing, and diffolving the Parliament, whenever it pleases, the latter have no affurance of having a regard paid to their Bills, or even of being allowed to assemble, but what may result from the need the Crown flands in of their affiftance: the danger, in that refpect, is even greater for the Commons than for the Lords, who enjoy a dignity which is hereditary, as well as inherent to their persons, and form a permanent Body in the State; whereas the Commons completely vanish, whenever a diffolution takes place there is, therefore, no exaggeration in what has been faid above, that their very being depends on their power of granting fubfidies to the Crown.

Moved by these confiderations, and, no doubt, by a fenfe of their duty towards their Constituents, to whom this right of taxation originally belongs, the House of Commons have at all times been very careful left precedents should be established, which might, in the most distant manner, tend to weaken that right. Hence the warmth, I might fay the refentment, with which they have always rejected even the amendments propofed by the Lords in their Money-Bills. The Lords, however, have not given up their pretension to make fuch amendments; and it is only by the vigilance and conftant predetermination of the Commons to reject all alteration whatever made in their Money-Bills, without even examining them, that this pretenfion of the Lords is reduced to be an ufelefs, and only dormant, claim. The first instance

of

Befides, though this prerogative has of itself, we may fay, an irrefiftible efficiency, the Parliament has neglected nothing that may increase it, or at least the facility of its exercife; and though they have allowed the general prerogatives of the Sovereign to remain undisputed, they have in feveral cafes endeavoured to reftrain the ufe he might make of them, by entering with him into divers express and folemn conventions for that purpose +.

Thus, the King is indisputably invefted with the exclufive right of affembling Parliaments : yet he must assemble one, at least once in three years; and this obligation on the King, which was, we find, infifted upon by the People in very early times, has been fince confirmed by an act passed in the fixteenth year of the reign of Charles the

Second.

Moreover, as the most fatal confequences might enfue, if laws which might most materially

may

fee at

of a misunderstanding between the two Houfes, on that ac-
count, was in the year 1671; and the reader
length, in Vol. I. of the Debates of the House of Commons,
the reasons that were at that time alledged on both sides.

Laws made to bind fuch Powers in a State, as have no

fuperior power by which they may be legally compelled to the
execution of them (for instance, the Crown, as circumftanced
in England)
are nothing more than general conventions, or
treaties, made with the Body of the People.
G 3

affect

affect public liberty, could be enacted in Parliaments abruptly and imperfectly fummoned, it has been established that the Writs for affembling a Parliament must be iffued forty days at least before the first meeting of it. Upon the fame principle it has also been enacted, that the King cannot abridge the term he has once fixed for a prorogation, except in the two following cafes, viz. of a rebellion, or of imminent danger of a foreign invafion; in both which cafes a fourteen days notice must be given *.

Again, the King is the head of the Churchbut he can neither alter the established religion, or call individuals to an account for their religious opinions t. He cannot even profess the religion which the Legislature has particularly forbidden; and the Prince who should profess it, is declared incapable of inheriting, poffeffing, or enjoying the Crown of these Kingdoms.

The King is the first Magiftrate; but he can make no change in the maxims and forms confecrated by law or cuftom; he cannot even in

* Stat. 30 Geo. II. c. 25,

The Convocation, or affembly of the Clergy, of which the King is the head, can only regulate fuch affairs as are merely ecclefiaftical; they cannot touch the Laws, Cuftoms, and Statutes, of the Kingdom.-Stat. 25 Hen. VIII. c. 19.

Will, and M. Stat. 2. c. 2.

fluence

Auence, in any cafe whatever, the decifion of causes between subject and subject; and James the First, affisting at the trial of a caufe, was reminded by the Judge, that he could deliver no opinion. Laftly, though crimes are profecuted in his name, he cannot refufe to lend it to any particular perfons who have complaints to prefer.

The King has the privilege of coining money; but he cannot alter the ftandard.

The King has the power of pardoning offenders; but he cannot exempt them from making a compensation to the parties injured. It is even eftablished by law, that, in a cafe of murder, the widow, or next heir, fhall have a right to profecute the murderer; and the King's pardon, whether it preceded the fentence paffed in confequence of fuch profecution, or whether it be granted after it, cannot have any effect†.

66

The

These principles have fince been made an exprefs article of an Act of Parliament; the fame which abolished the Star-Chamber. “Be it likewife declared and enacted, by "the authority of this prefent Parliament, That neither his Majefty, nor his Privy Council, have, or ought to have any jurifdiction, power or authority, to examine or draw "into queftion, determine, or difpofe of the lands, tenements, "goods, or chattels, of any of the subjects of this King"dom."-Stat. A. 16. Ch. I. cap. o. § 10.

†The method of profecution mentioned here, is called