property and to perfonal fafety, would foon be looked upon as an old-fashioned doctrine, which the Judge himself would ridicule from the Bench. And the liberty of the prefs, now fo univerfally and warmly vindicated, would, without lofs of time, be cried down and fuppreffed, as only ferving to keep up the infolence and pride of a refractory people.

And let us not believe that the mistaken. People, whofe Reprefentatives we now behold making fuch a firm ftand against the indivifible power of the Crown, would, amidst the general devastation of every thing they hold dear, eafily find Men equally difpofed to reprefs the encroaching, while attainable, power of a Senate and Body of Nobles.

The time would be no more when the People, upon whatever Men they let their choice fall, are fure to find them ready fincerely to join in the fupport of every important branch of public liberty.

Prefent or expected perfonal power, and independence on the laws, being now the confequence of the truft of the People,-wherever they should apply for fervants, they would only meet with betrayers. Corrupting as it were every thing they should touch, they could confer no favour upon an individual but to destroy his pub

lic virtue; and (to repeat the words used in a former Chapter) "their raifing a Man would "only be immediately inspiring him with views "directly oppofite to their own, and fending him to increase the number of their enemies."

66

All thefe confiderations ftrongly point out the very great caution which is neceffary to be used in the difficult bufinefs of laying new reftraints on the governing authority. Let therefore the lefs informed part of the People, whofe zeal requires to be kept up by vifible objects, look if they choose upon the Crown as the only feat of the evils they are exposed to; mistaken notions on their part are less dangerous than political indifference; and they are more eafily directed than roufed-but at the fame time, let the more enlightened part of the Nation conftantly remember that the Constitution only fubfifts by virtue of a properer equilibrium,-by a line being drawn between Power and Liberty.

Made wife by the examples of feveral other Nations, by thofe which the Hiftory of this very Country affords, let the People, in the heat of their struggles in the defence of liberty, always take heed, only to reach, never to overshoot, the mark, only to reprefs, never to transfer and diffuse Power.

Amidst the alarms that may at particular

times arise from the really awful authority of the Crown, let it, on the one hand, be remembered, that even the power of the Tudors was oppofed and fubdued, and on the other let it be looked upon as a fundamental maxim, that, whenever the prospect of perfonal power and independence on the governing authority, fhall offer to the view of the Members of the Legislature, or in general of those Men to whom the People. must trust, even hope itself is destroyed. The Hollander, in the midst of a ftorm, though trufting to the experienced ftrength of the mounds that protect him, fhudders no doubt at the fight of the foaming element that furrounds him; but they all gave themselves over for loft, when they thought the worm had got into their dykes *.

* Such new forms as may prove destructive of the rea. fubftance of a Government, may be unwarily adopted, in the fame manner as the fuperftitious notions and practices described in my Work, intitled Memorials of Human Superftition, may be introduced into a Religion, fo as to entirely fubvert the true spirit of it

CHAP.

CHA P. XX.

A few additional Obfervations on the Right of Taxation which is lodged in the Hands of the Reprefentatives of the People. What kind of Danger this Right may be exposed to.

THE generality of Men, or at least of Politi

cians, feem to confider the right of taxing themselves, enjoyed by the English Nation, as being no more than a means of fecuring their property against the attempts of the Crown; while they overlook the nobler and more extenfive efficiency of that privilege.

The right to grant fubfidies to the Crown, poffeffed by the People of England, is the safe-guard of all their other liberties, religious and civil; it is a regular means conferred on them by the Conftitution, of influencing the motion of the Executive power and it forms the tie by which the latter is bound to them. In fhort, this privilege is a fure pledge in their hands, that their Sovereign, who can difmifs their Representatives at his pleasure, will never entertain thoughts of ruling without the affiftance of these.

If, through unforeseen events, the Crown could attain to be independent on the People

in regard to its fupplies, fuch is the extent of its Prerogative, that from that moment, all the means the People poffefs to vindicate their liberty, would be annihilated. They would have no refource left,-except indeed that uncertain and calamitous one, of an appeal to the sword; which is no more, after all, than what the most enslaved Nations enjoy.

Let us suppose, for inftance, that abuses of power should be committed, which, either by their immediate operation, or by the precedents they might establish, fhould undermine the liberty of the subject. The People, it will be faid, would then have their remedy in the Legiflative power poffeffed by their Reprefentatives. The latter would, at the first opportunity, interfere, and frame fuch Bills as would prevent the like abuses for the future. But here we muft obferve, that the Affent of the Sovereign is neceffary to make thofe Bills become. Laws and if, as we have juft now fuppofed, he had no need of the fupport of the Commons, how could they obtain his affent to laws thus purposely framed to abridge his authority?

Again,let us fuppofe that, instead of contenting itself with making flow advances to defpotifm, the Executive power, or its Ministers, fhould at once openly invade the liberty of the fubject. Kk Obnoxi