( the imminent dangers, or at least the alarms and perplexities, in which the Kings of England have conftantly involved themfelves, whenever they have attempted to ftruggle against the general sense ofthe Nation, manifeftly shew that all that has been above obferved, concerning the fecurity and remarkable ftability fomehow annexed to their Office, is to be understood, not of the capricious power of the Man, but of the lawful authority of the Head of the State *. Second * One more obfervation might be made on the subject; which is, that when the kingly dignity has happened in England to be wrefted from the poffeffor, through fome revolution, it has been recovered, or ftruggled for with more difficulty than in other Countries: in all the other countries upon earth, a King de jure (by claim) poffeffes advantages in regard to the King in being, much fuperior to thofe of which the fame circumftance may be productive in England. The power of the other Sovereigns in the World is not fo fecurely established as that of an English King; but then their character is more indelible; that is to fay,-till their Antagonists have fucceeded in cutting them off and their families, they poffefs in a high degree a power to renew thefe claims, and disturb the State. Thofe family pleas or claims of priority, and in general thofe arguments to which the bulk of Mankind have agreed to allow fo much weight, cease almost entirely to be of any effect in England, against the perfon actually invested with the kingly office, as foon as the conftitutional parts and fprings have begun to move, and in short as foon as the machine of the Government has once begun to be in full play. Dd 2 An Second Part of the fame Chapter. THERE is certainly a very great degree of fingularity in all the circumftances we have been defcribing here: thofe perfons who are acquainted with the hiftory of other Countries, cannot but remark with furprise that stability of the power of the English Crown,-that myfterious folidity, that inward binding ftrength with which it is able to carry on with certainty its legal operations, amidst the clamorous ftruggle and uproar with which it is commonly furrounded, and without the medium of any armed threatening force To give a demonftration of the manner in which all these things are brought to bear and operate, is not, as I said before, my design to attempt here; the principles from which fuch demonftration is to be derived, fuppofe an inquiry into the nature of Man, and of human af An univerfal national ferment, fimilar to that which produced the former disturbances, is the only time of real danger. The remarkable degree of internal national quiet, which, for very near a century past, has followed the Revolution of the year 1689, is a remarkable proof of the truth of the obfervations above made; nor do I think that, all circumftances being confidered, any other Country can produce the like inftance. fairs, which rather belongs to philofophy (though to a branch hitherto unexplored) than to Politics: at least fuch an inquiry certainly lies out of the fphere of the common Science of Politics*. However, I had a very material reason in introducing all the abovementioned facts concerning the peculiar ftability of the governing authority of England, in that they lead to an observation of a most important political nature; which is, that this stability allows several effential branches of Englifh liberty to take place, which, without it, could not exist. For there is a very effential confideration to be made in every fcience, though fpeculators are fometimes apt to lofe fight of it, which is, that in order that things may have existence, they must be poffible; in order that political regulations of any kind may obtain their effect, they muft imply no direct contradiction, either open or hidden, to the nature of things, or to the other circumftances of the Government. In reafoning from this principle, we fhall find that the stability of the Governing executive authority in * It may, if the reader pleases, belong to the Science of Metapolitics; in the fame fenfe as we fay Metaphyfics; that is, the Science of those things which lie beyond phyfical, or fubftantial things. A few more words are bestowed upon the fame fubject in the Advertisement, or Preface, at the head of this Work. England, and the weight it gives to the whole machine of the State, have actually enabled the English Nation, confidered as a free Nation, to enjoy feveral advantages which would really have been totally unattainable in the other States we have mentioned in former Chapters, whatever degree of public virtue we might even fuppose to have belonged to those who acted in those States as the Advisers of the People, or in general who were trufted with the business of framing the laws *. One of these advantages refulting from the Solidity of the Government, is, the extraordinary perfonal freedom which all ranks of individuals in England enjoy at the expenfe of the governing authority. In the Roman Commonwealth, for inftance, we fee the Senate to have been vefted with a number of powers totally deftructive of the liberty of the Citizens: and the continuance of these powers was, no doubt, in a great measure owing to the treacherous remiffness of those men in whom the People trufted for repreffing them, or even to their determined refolution not to abridge thofe prerogatives. Yet, if * I fhould be very well fatisfied though only the more reflecting class of readers were fully to understand the tendency of this Chapter: in the mean time it is confiderably illuftrated beyond what it was in the former Editions, we we attentively confider the conftant fituation of affairs in that Republic, we shall find that though we might fuppofe thofe perfons to have been. ever so truly attached to the cause of the People, it would not really have heen poffible for them to procure to the People an entire fecurity. The right enjoyed by the Senate, of fuddenly naming a Dictator with a power unreftrained by any law, or of investing the Confuls with an authority of much the fame kind, and the power it at times affumed of making formidable examples of arbitrary Juftice, were refources of which the Repub. lic could not, perhaps, with fafety have been totally deprived and though thefe expedients frequently were used to destroy the just liberty of the People, yet they were alfo very often the means of preferving the Commonwealth. Upon the fame principle we should poffibly find that the Oftracism, that arbitrary method of banifhing Citizens, was a neceffary refource in the Republic of Athens. A Venetian Noble would perhaps alfo confefs, that, however terrible the State Inquifition, established in his Republic, may be even to the Nobles themselves, yet it would not be prudent entirely to abolish it. And we do not know but a Minister of State in France, though we might fuppofe him ever fo virtuous and moderate a Man, would fay the fame with |