Public meetings, in fuch circumstances, would be appointed; general subscriptions would be entered into, to fupport the expenses, whatever they might be, of fuch a neceffary oppofition; and all private and unworthy purposes being fuppressed by the sense of the National danger, the choice of the electors would then be wholly determined by the confideration of the public fpirit of the Candidates, and the tokens given by them of fuch fpirit. Thus were thofe Parliaments formed, which fuppreffed arbitrary taxes and imprisonments. Thus was it, that, under Charles the Second, the People, when recovered from that enthusiasm of affection with which they received a King fo long perfecuted, at laft returned to him no Parliaments but fuch as were compofed of a majority of Men attached to public liberty. Thus it was, that, persevering in a conduct which the circumftances of the times rendered neceffary, the People baffled the arts of the Government; and Charles diffolved three fucceffive Parliaments, without any other effect but that of having those fame Men re-chofen, and fet again in oppofition to him, of whom he hoped he had rid himself for ever. Nor was James the Second happier in his attempts than Charles had been. This Prince foon experienced that his Parliament was actuated by the fame spirit as thofe which had opposed the defigns of his late brother; and having fuffered himself to be led into measures of violence, instead of being better taught by the discovery he made of the real fentiments of the People, his reign was terminated by that catastrophe with which every one is acquainted. Indeed, if we combine the right enjoyed by the People of England, of electing their Representatives, with the whole of the English Government, we fhall become continually more and more fenfible of the excellent effects that may refult from that right. All Men in the State are, as has been before obferved, really interested in the fupport of public liberty;-nothing but temporary motives, and fuch as are quite peculiar to themselves, can poffibly induce the Members of any Houfe of Commons to connive at measures deftructive of this liberty: the People, therefore, under fuch circumftances, need only change these Members, in order effectually to reform the conduct of that House: and it may fairly be pronounced beforehand, that a House of Commons, compofed of a new set of perfons, will, from this bare circumstance, be in the interefts of the People. Hence, Hence, though the complaints of the People do not always meet with a speedy and immediate redrefs (a celerity which would be the fymptom of a fatal unfteadiness in the Conftitution, and would fooner or later bring on its ruin); yet, when we attentively confider the nature and the refources of this Conftitution, we shall not think it too bold an affertion to fay, that it is impoffible but that complaints in which the People persevere, that is (to repeat it once more) wellgrounded complaints, will fooner or later be redreffed, CHAP. XIV. Right of Refiftance. BUT all those privileges of the People, confidered in themselves, are but feeble defences against the real strength of those who govern. All those provifions, all thofe reciprocal Rights, neceffarily fuppofe that things remain in their legal and fettled course: what would then be the resource of the People, if ever the Prince, suddenly freeing himself from all restraint, and throwing himself as it were out of the Conftitution, fhould no longer respect either the person or the pro perty of the Subject, and either fhould make no account of his conventions with the Parliament, or attempt to force it implicitly to fubmit to his will?-It would be resistance. Without entering here into the difcuffion of a doctrine which would lead us to inquire into the first principles of Civil Government, confequently engage us in a long difquifition, and with regard to which, befides, perfons free from prejudices agree pretty much in their opinions, I fhall anly observe here (and it will be fufficient for my purpose) that the queftion has been decided in favour of this doctrine by the Laws of England, and that resistance is looked upon by them as the ultimate and lawful refource against the violences of Power. It was refiftance that gave birth to the Great Charter, that lafting foundation of English Liberty; and the exceffes of a power established by force, were also restrained by force*. It has * Lord Lyttelton fays, extremely well, in his Perfian Letters, "If the privileges of the People of England be concef"fions from the Crown, is not the power of the Crown it"self a conceffion from the People?" It might be said with equal truth, and somewhat more in point to the subject of this Chapter,-If the privileges of the People be an encroachment on the power of Kings, the power itself of Kings was at first an encroachment (no matter whether effected by surprise) on the natural liberty of the People. been been by the fame means that, at different times, the People have procured the confirmation of the fame Charter. Laftly, it has also been the refiftance to a King who made no account of his own engagements, that has, in the iffue, placed on the Throne the family which is now in poffeffion of it. This is not all; this resource, which till then had only been an act of force opposed to other acts of force, was, at that æra, expressly recognised by the Law itfelf. The Lords and Commons, folemnly affembled, declared, that " King James the Second, having endeavoured to fub"vert the Conftitution of the Kingdom, by breaking the original contract between King "and People, and having violated the funda"mental laws, and withdrawn himself, had ab"dicated the Government; and that the Throne "was thereby vacant*." And left those principles to which the Revolution thus gave a fanction, fhould, in process of time, become mere arcana of State, exclusively appropriated, and only known to a certain class of Subjects, the fame Act, we have just mentioned, exprefsly infured to individuals the right of * The Bill of Rights has fince given a new fanction to all thefe principles. |