Though wife Men fometimes may, led aftray by the power of names, and the heat of political contentions, lofe fight of what ought to be their real aim, they nevertheless know that it is not against the Appii, the Coruncanii, the Cethegi, but against all those who can influence the execution of the laws, that precautions ought to be taken,— that it is not the Conful, the Prætor, the Archon, the Minister, the King, whom we ought to dread, nor the Tribune or the Reprefentative of the People, on whom we ought implicitly to rely: but that all those persons, without distinction, ought to be the objects of our jealoufy, who by any methods, and under any names whatsoever, have acquired the means of turning against each individual the collective strength of all, and have fo ordered things around themselves, that whoever attempts to refift them, is fure to find himself engaged alone against a thousand.

1

CHA P. X.

Fundamental difference between the English Government, and the Governments just defcribed -In England all Executive Authority is placed out of the bands of thofe in whom the People truft.-Ufefulnes, of the Power of the Crown.

IN what manner then has the English Confti

tution contrived to find a remedy for evils which, from the very nature of Men and things, feem to be irremediable? How has it found means to oblige thofe perfons to whom the People have given up their power, to make them effectual and lafting returns of gratitude?—thofe who enjoy an exclufive authority, to feek the advantage of all?those who make the laws, to make only equitable ones? It has been by fubjecting themselves to thofe laws, and for that purpofe excluding them from all share in the execution of them.

Thus, the Parliament can eftablish as numerous a standing army as it pleases; but immediately another Power comes forward, which takes the abfolute command of it, which fills all the pofts in it, and directs its motions at its pleasure. The Parliament may lay new taxes; but imme

diately another power feizes upon the produce of

them, and alone enjoys the advantages and glory arifing from the difpofal of it. The Parliament

may

may even, if you please, repeal the laws on which the safety of the Subject is grounded; but it is not their own caprices and arbitrary humours, it is the caprices and paffions of other Men, which they will have gratified, when they fhall thus have overthrown the columns of public liberty.

And the English Constitution has not only excluded from any fhare in the Execution of the laws, thofe in whom the people trust for the enacting them, but it has alfo taken from them what would have had the fame pernicious influ-ence on their deliberations-the hope of ever invading that executive authority, and transferring it to themselves.

This authority has been made in England one fingle, indivifible prerogative; it has been made for ever the unalienable attribute of one person, marked out and ascertained before-hand by folemn laws and long-eftablished custom; and all the active forces in the State have been left at his difpofal.

In order to fecure this prerogative still farther against all poffibility of invafions from individuals, it has been heightened and strengthened by every thing that can attract and fix the attention and reverence of the people. The power of conferring and withdrawing places and employments has also been added to it; and ambition itfelf has thus been interefted in its defence and fervice.

A fhare in the Legislative power has also been given to the Man to whom this prerogative has been delegated; a paffive fhare indeed, and the only one that can, with fafety to the State, be trusted to him, but by means of which he is enabled to defeat every attempt against his conftitu-, tional authority.

Laftly, he is the only felf-exifting and per-. manent Power in the State. The Generals, the Ministers of State, are fo only by the continuance of his pleasure. He would even difmifs the Parliament themselves, if ever he faw them begin to entertain dangerous designs; and he needs only fay one word to disperse every power in the State that may threaten his authority. Formidable prerogatives thefe; but with regard to which we fhall be inclined to lay afide our apprehenfions, if we reflect, on the one hand, on the great privileges of the People by which they have been counter-balanced, and on the other, on the happy confequences that refult from their being thus united together.

From this unity, and, if I may so express myfelf, this total fequeftration of the Executive authority, this advantageous confequence in the first place follows, which has been mentioned in a preceding Chapter, that the attention of the whole Nation is directed to one and the fame object. The people, befides, enjoy this most effential

9

fential advantage, which they would vainly endeavour to obtain under the government of many, they can give their confidence, without giving power over themselves, and against themfelves; they can appoint Trustees, and yet not give themselves Masters.

Those Men to whom the People have delegated the power of framing the Laws, are thereby made sure to feel the whole preffure of them. They can increase the prerogatives of the executive authority, but they cannot invest themselves. with it: they have it not in their power to command its motions, they only can unbind its hands.

They are made to derive their importance, nay, they are indebted for their existence, to the need in which that Power stands of their assistance; and they know that they would no fooner have abused the truft of the People, and completed the treacherous work, than they would see themselves diffolved, fpurned, like inftruments now spent, and become useless.

This fame difpofition of things alfo prevents in England that effential defect, inherent in the Government of many, which has been described in the preceding Chapter.

In that fort of Government, the cause of the People, as has been obferved, is continually deferted and betrayed. The arbitrary prerogatives of