fons entrufted with the Executive power were still in a state of dependence on the Legislature, and confequently frequently obliged to have recourfe to it, we fhall fee almoft continual inftances of selfish and infidious laws proposed by them to the Affemblies of the people.

And thofe Men in whose wisdom the law had at first placed fo much confidence, became, in the iffue, fo loft to all fenfe of fhame and duty, that when arguments were found to be no longer fufficient, they had recourfe to force; the legiflative Affemblies became fo many fields of battle, and their power, a real calamity.

I know very well, however, that there are other important circumftances befides those I have just mentioned, which would prevent diforders of this kind from taking place in England *. But, on the other hand, let us call to mind that the person who, in England, is invefted with the Executive authority, unites in himself the whole public power and majesty. Let us represent to ourselves the great and fole Magistrate of the Nation, preffing the acceptance of thofe laws which he had propofed, with a vehemence suited to the

* I particularly mean here, the circumstance of the People having entirely delegated their power to their Representatives: the confequences of which Inftitution will be discuffed in the next Chapter.

usual

ufual importance of his defigns, with the warmth of Monarchical pride, which must meet with no refufal, and exerting for that purpose all his im menfe refources.

It was therefore a matter of indispensable neceffity, that things fhould be settled in England in the manner they are. As the moving springs of the Executive power are, in the hands of the King, a kind of facred depofitum, fo are those of the Legislative Power in the hands of the two Houses. The King must abstain from touching them, in the same manner as all the subjects of the kingdom are bound to fubmit to his prerogatives. When he fits in Parliament, he has left, we may fay, his executive power without doors, and can only affent or diffent. If the Crown had been allowed to take an active part in the business of making laws, it would foon have rendered useless the other branches of the Legislature.

СН АР.

CHA P. V.

J

In which an Inquiry is made, whether it would be an Advantage to public Liberty, that the Laws fhould be enacted by the Votes of the People at large.

BUT it will be faid, whatever may be the wif

dom of the English Laws, how great foever their precautions may be with regard to the fafety of the individual, the People, as they do not themselves expressly enact them, cannot be looked upon as a free People. The Author of the Social Contract carries this opinion even farther; he fays, that "though the People of England "think they are free, they are much mistaken;

they are fo only during the election of Mem"bers for Parliament: as foon as these are elect"ed, the People are flaves-they are nothing*."

Before I answer this objection, I shall obferve, that the word Liberty is one of those which have been most misunderstood or mifapplied.

Thus, at Rome, where that clafs of Citizens who were really Mafters of the State, were fenfible that a lawful regular authority, once trusted

See M. Rouffeau's Social Contract, chap. xv.

to

to a fingle Ruler, would put an end to their tyranny, they taught the People to believe, that, provided those who exercised a military power over them, and overwhelmed them with infults, went by the names of Confules, Dictatores, Patricii, Nobiles, in a word, by any other appellation than that horrid one of Rex, they were free, and that fuch a valuable situation must be preferred at the price of every calamity.

In the fame manner, certain Writers of the prefent age, misled by their inconfiderate admiration of the Governments of ancient times, and perhaps alfo by a defire of presenting lively contrafts to what they call the degenerate manners of our modern times, have cried up the governments of Sparta and Rome, as the only ones fit for us to imitate. In their opinions, the only proper employment of a free Citizen is, to be either inceffantly affembled in the forum, or preparing for War.-Being valiant, inured to hardships, inflamed with an ardent love of one's Country, which is, after all, nothing more than an ardent defire of injuring all Mankind for the fake of that Society of which we are Members-and with an ardent love of glory, which is likewise nothing more than an ardent defire of committing flaughter, in order to make afterwards a boast of it, have appeared to these Writers to be the only focial qua

lifications

lifications worthy of our esteem, and of the encouragement of law-givers *. And while, in order to fupport fuch opinions, they have used a profufion of exaggerated expreffions without any distinct meaning, and perpetually repeated, though without defining them, the words daftardlinefs, corruption, greatness of foul, and virtue, they have never once thought of telling us the only thing that was worth our knowing, which is, whether men were happy under those Governments which they fo much exhorted us to imitate.

Nor, while they thus mifapprehended the only rational defign of civil Societies, have they better understood the true end of the particular institutions by which they were to be regulated. They were fatisfied when they faw the few who really governed every thing in the state, at times perform the illufory ceremony of affembling the body of the People, that they might appear to confult them: and the mere giving of votes, under any disadvantage in the manner of giving them, and how much foever the law might afterwards be neglected that was thus pretended to

* I have used all the above expreffions in the fame sense in which they were used in the ancient Common-wealths, and ftill are by most of the Writers who describe their Govern

ments.

have