sal pastors and ministers to all the churches in the world. Here then is one fact which appears to be ascertained, that there was a reference from the ministers and members at Antioch to another court at Jerusalem, which was not only competent completely to decide on the question referred, but which, even as uninspired, possessed the high authority of a general council, which could give universality to its decrees, and composed, as far as is recorded, of none but office-bearers.

But admitting that there was a reference here to another court, consisting of ecclesiastical office-bearers only, what was the degree of power which they exercised? Did they communicate an advice only to the ministers at Antioch? or did they deliver a subordinately authoritative decision? That the latter, and not the former, was the degree of power which they are said to have exercised, appears, agreeably to our Second position, to be very clearly manifested from the following considerations :

The decision which they delivered, as was before stated, is called a decree, Acts xvi. 4; and the word doyua, there rendered decree, in the only other four instances where it occurs in the New Testament, denotes, not merely an advice. or opinion, but a law, or highly authoritative injunction.Thus, in Luke ii. 1, and Acts xvii. 7, it signifies the decrees of the Roman Emperor, which certainly were more' than simple advices; and in Eph. ii. 15, and Col. ii. 14, the ordinances or commandments of the ceremonial law, which certainly were more than admonitions. It is used also by the Seventy, in their translation of Dan. ii. 13, iii. 10, 29, and iv. 6, to express the decrees or mandates of Nebuchadnezzar and Dan. vi. 8, 9, 12, 15, 26, the imperial decrees of Darius, as well as in two of the ver ses of that chapter, to signify the laws of the Medes and Persians, which altered not. Nor does the verb doyaTw, in Col. ii. 20, the only instance produced by Independents in support of their opinion, seem to denote subjection merely to doctrine or instruction, but, as our translators have rendered it, to ordinances or commandments.— The things, for their undue subjection to which Paul reproves the Colossians, are called in ver. 22, the commandments of men, Evraλμara, by which we are unquestionably to understand the ceremonial precepts of the Mosaic law, which were originally binding as the commandments of God,

but at that time were obligatory, upon those who chose to obey them, only as the commandments of men *.

Not only, however, is the decision of the apostles and elders called a decree, but we are informed, Acts xvii. 4, it was ordained by them, xxguevov, a word which, when applied to an assembly, and added to the former, imports the most decided exercise of authority. It is employed for instance, by the Seventy, in their version of Esther ii. 1, to express the judgment of a Persian council against Queen Vashti, when they decreed that she should be degraded from her regal situation; and the word cuyxgua, which is derived from it, is used, in their translation of Dan. iv. 17, 24, &c. to signify a decree. And in Acts xxiv. 6, it denotes the authority of the Jewish sanhedrin, or council of the elders, which Tertullus declares was ready to have proceeded to pronounce judgment upon Paul-as in Acts xiii. 27, it expresses the authority of this very court, when they tried and condemned the blessed Saviour. I do not, indeed, recollect a single instance where it is not to be so understood, when applied to an assembly of judges or rulers.

The conduct, moreover, of the apostles and elders, on this occasion, is expressed by their laying what appeared to them a necessary burden on the church of Antioch, than which words, I apprehend, few can be conceived more strongly descriptive of the exercise of authority. Nor is it of any importance to object that the verse should be rendered, "It seem"ed good to the Holy Ghost, and to us, that no burden "shall henceforth be laid upon you but these necessary "things," and to assert that this burden is the same thing with the yoke mentioned,, ver. 10, for still, as Mr. Ewing allows, p. 74, 75, it implies that a burden was laid on them. When we are told, Matth. xxiii. 4, that the Pharisaic Rabbis bound heavy burdens upon the shoulders of men, do we not perceive something more than mere instruction or admo

Accordingly doyparole, in Col. ii. 20, is explained, in the very ancient Syriac version, by a word which is equivalent to judicamini—“ Are ye judged by these commandments?" by Erasmus and Bullinger, "Decretis tenemini-Are ye bound by these decrees of "men?" by Gualther, Stephanus, and Beza, "Ritibus oneramini-"Are ye loaded with these rites or observances?" and by Budæus, Leigh, Parkhurst, Wetstein, and Kypke, "Have ye these decrees "or ordinances imposed upon you? or, Are you subject to these "ordinances?"

nition designed, and that they delivered them as their taxMata, or commandments, Matth. xv. 9, which all were to obey who wished to be considered as of their sect? In fine, this decree ordaining necessary things or burdens, we are informed, ver. 28, seemed good to them, as well as to the Holy Ghost: "It seemed good to the Holy Ghost, and," as it is in the Arabic version," it seemed good to us."And that this denotes a judicial decision seems manifest, not only from what has been already stated, but from the import of this phrase, when applied to the decision of an as--sembly of rulers. Thus Josephus (Antiq. book iv. chap. viii), speaking of a decree of their great sanhedrin, disobedience to which was punished by death, represents it as To doxovr; i. e. "what seemed good to them." Thus too, Demosthenes, as quoted by Stephanus, didoxa on Bourn, "it is decreed by the senate ;" and Plato, as cited by Budæus, dedoxtai pa xalavu," it is certainly appointed for "me to die." Whether, then, we consider these expressions separately, or attend to them as united, nothing seems plainer than that the decision which was given by this assembly at Jerusalem was not merely an advice or a declaration, whether they had commissioned these heretical teachers who had come down to Antioch to publish their errors, or whether what was taught by them was agreeable to the doctrine of repentance unto life, but an authoritative determination, to which the church at Antioch was bound most cheerfully to submit in the Lord.

Still however, though this was an authoritative determination, are we certain that they were not directed in it by a miraculous influence? That this was the case is asserted by Mr. Glass, in his Letters to Ayton, where he says, that "the apostles acted in this council as apostles, "and were guided by an extraordinary miraculous influence." Mr. Ewing also says, that the reference was made to the apostles, as inspired; that the elders too, who were joined with them, were probably inspired; that the miraculous gifts of the Spirit were very generally enjoyed in the church at Jerusalem; and that when the minister of this court pronounced these words, "It seemed good to the Holy Ghost "and to us," they spoke them unquestionably as infallible And you avow this to be your own opinion, and endeavour to defend it by a variety of arguments. Let us then inqure, Thirdly, Whether they were directed by this

men.

influence in the case before us, or were left to the exercise of their own wisdom and sagacity?

That the apostles were not uniformly directed by a miraculous influence I think you must grant, if you reflect for a moment on what is recorded in the gospel-history. Many of their actions, as was formerly noticed, such as the ordination of deacons, the dispensation of the sacraments, the preaching of the word, and, in many instances, the government of the church, did not require such a preternatural influence, for they were performed by men who were not inspired, and are still performed by men who have no miraculous influence, either of suggestion or of superintendence. To prove that what was done in this assembly was the dictate of inspiration, it is not sufficient to say that it was done partly by apostles, since even they were not always miraculously guided, but were left, with the common ministers of the church in every age, to their own wisdom and reflection, and the usual aids of the divine Spirit. You must produce something either from the subject of reference which was submitted to their investigation, or from their mode of procedure, or from their express declaration, or from the subsequent testimony of the sacred historian, before your hypothesis can be admitted. But from none of these, I apprehend, can this deduction be made, while, on the contrary, it seems probable, from a number of circumstances, that, in the whole of this business, they acted only as common mi

nisters.

In the first place, Paul and Barnabas, at the original discussion at Antioch, acted not in the high character of apostles, but only of ordinary ministers. Had not this been the case, they could never have submitted to the režis or appointment of the church at Antioch to go up to Jerusalem, (Acts xv. 2), for as an apostle, Paul was far superior to them all, as Barnabas was to many of them, and could never have been authoritatively appointed by them. But had these ministers, when they delivered the very same opinion, as to the mind of the Spirit, which was afterwards affirmed in the council at Jerusalem, acted as inspired, or as directed by a miraculous superintending energy, can we suppose for a moment, that in supporting their pretensions, they would resign the extroardinary character which they assumed, and submit to a common decision of the office-bearers, appointing them to go up as commissioners to Jerusalem for

the decision of the cause? What right had the ministers, or members, at Antioch, to ordain these extroardinary ministers of Christ, who, inspired, or miraculously directed by his Spirit, had made known to them a part of his will, to go up to Jerusalem to ascertain whether the doctrine which they taught was true, and whether it corresponded with that of the other apostles, or to obtain any determination from these ministers on that subject? If Paul and Barnabas however, though extraordinary ministers at the beginning of this business, did not act as extraordinary, but as ordinary ministers, this is one point at least, in which their pre-eminent character was laid aside; and it must require very strong evidence to convince us, that when the rest of the apostles met at Jerusalem, and delivered precisely the very same determination, they acted in a character in any degree superior.

2dly, If this question was to be determined by inspiration, it was unnecessary to have gone to Jerusalem for the decision. Paul certainly, as well as the other inspired ministers, was as able to have delivered such a decision as the apostles at Jerusalem; and unquestionably if evidence had been presented to the ministers of the church of Antioch, that the Holy Ghost, in a supernatural manner, had settled the matter, by communicating to them his will through a single minister, it must have been as decisive as if he had spoken to them by twelve. Is it said, that the Judaizing teachers at Antioch might have represented the other apostles at Jerusalem as of a different mind from Paul and Barnabas? It is replied, that not a single hint of this is mentioned in the whole of the narrative, a circumstance which is surprizing, if that was the ground of the reference. Besides, the miracles which were performed by Paul as an extraordinary minister, when, in this as well as other parts of the doctrine which he delivered, he laid claim to the character of an infallible teacher, (Gal. iii. 5), must have completely silenced such an objection, and satisfied the minds of the christians at Antioch. Certainly it must have occurred to the brethren in that city, that the Holy Ghost could not contradict himself, and that he would not enable Paul to perform amongst them the same striking miracles in attestation of his doctrine, on the point in question, which he did at Galatia for that very purpose, if the sentiments of this minister had been contrary to those of the other inspired