[See Note B]. In the recent contest on the shores | larly in this country, by the improvements and exof Syria, the presence of a few small Austrian ves- tension of steam power upon the ocean, upon all sels of war, was of little importance in a physical our lakes and rivers, and as connected with railpoint of view, but the co-operation of this small roads,-seem to require an entire revision of the force was a pledge to the world, that 400,000 men former plan. This plan was prepared by a Board, [See Note C] in the heart of Europe were ready which was composed of officers of the Engineers to act, in case they should be required to resist and of the Navy, and a similar Board would apthe hostile intervention of any other power. pear to be the most competent for its revision. The particular cases which are cited as proofs The officers of each service could furnish the inof the insufficiency of our force for giving proper formation peculiar to each, and adjust the extent protection, are the recent blockades by France of and proportion of each class of force that would some of the ports of Mexico and the Argentine be required and could be most advantageously emrepublic, and the existing difficulties between Great ployed at different positions.

war.

Britain and China. The chief causes or grounds The praises bestowed by "Harry Bluff" upon of these complaints are the recognition of block-the Navy officers for the plan of defence which he ades, when there was no formal declaration of says they furnished and urged in 1819, and the In the opinion of "Harry Bluff," the want severe censures which he passes upon that, by of this formal declaration would not only have jus- which, he says, their's was smothered, seem to be tified, but required, the employment of sufficient equally undeserved. He will find upon a more careforce to disregard or resist the blockades. Al- ful investigation, that the alleged report and plan by though our own practice has in some instances the Navy officers, has no existence except in his imabeen similar, let it be granted that this want of a gination; [See Note E]-that the action of the formal proclamation of war was an irregularity Navy and Army officers was joint, not separate; and that could not be admitted. In such a case, would the public may perhaps doubt whether a plan recomnot a proper regard to friendly relations require mended by such names as Swift, Bernard, McRee, remonstrance to the government of France, before Armistead and Totten, among others, may not force was resorted to? If this had been made, have had some claims to favorable consideration, France could have removed the alleged cause of although "Harry Bluff" is of opinion that it was complaint, by adding to her acts a declaration of "fit only to be discussed by the inmates of a madOr if she declined doing this, we could then house." Such harsh expressions can hardly be with better show of justice have resorted to force, justified when applied with a perfect knowledge of if for such a cause it had been deemed expedient all the facts, much less so by one who appears to involve the country in a war. The same rea- not to have been fully informed upon the subject. soning will apply to England and China; and with all due deference to the opinion of "Harry Bluff," it may well be doubted, whether the interests of commerce and the interests or the honor of the country would have been better secured by the adoption of his propositions, than they have been by those means which the government has thought proper to employ. [See Note D.]

war.

The strength of the Navy and our state of preparation in steam vessels and in fortifications, when viewed in connection with the protection of our extensive Atlantic coasts and lake frontier, is undoubtedly insufficient. That it is so, must be imputed to higher authorities than the officers of either the Army or the Navy. The necessity for increase has been urged by them and by the heads of their respective departments from year to year, but Congress has either withheld necessary appropriations or made them so sparingly, that the country is still almost as defenceless in these particulars, as it was at the close of the late war. This has been owing perhaps, to doubts of the expediency of completing a system which was adapted to the situation of the country twenty years since.

The suggestion that our best policy is to act entirely on the defensive, will not, it is hoped, meet with general favor. Such a plan would leave to an enemy the choice of time, place and mode of attack. With a sea-coast of such great extent as ours, upon which there are so many positions where it is important for us to prevent the near approach of an enemy, such a system of defence would seem to be fraught with infinite danger, and to lead to enormous expense. The true interests of the country and the spirit of our people will hardly permit the adoption of such a system. On the contrary, both unite in requiring one which will enable us to meet the enemy before he reaches our shores, or, if practicable, to confine him to his own ports,-[See Note F] at all events, to retard his progress, interrupt his plans, and confine his sphere of action.

This passive defensive system was contemplated for our little Navy at the commencement of the last war, and but for the earnest remonstrances of two Captains, then at the seat of government, our ships would not have been permitted to act on their only proper element-the ocean. What would have been the fate of the Navy, or its value in the esThe great changes which have been made in timation of the country now, had the passive dethe elements of attack and defence, and particu- 'fensive system at that time prevailed! For the

If

honor and the interests of the country, may it sels, might be manned with about 32,000 men. never be again proposed. these numbers are assumed, and the officers for Whether the present numbers of officers in the each are regulated by the number supposed to be respective ranks bear a due proportion to each sufficient only for the proper performance of duties, other, and whether they are sufficiently large to and the present numbers for commands of squadmeet the probable future wants of the country, are rons and shore duties be retained, while an addiquestions of vital importance to the Navy itself, tion is made of one fifth of that aggregate for and to the interests of the country as connected casualties and sickness, the following will be found with or dependent upon its efficiency. The manner to be the number required and deficient: viz.

in which "Harry Bluff" has estimated the future demand for officers, and compared the present numbers with that future demand, does not appear to have been done with sufficient care, nor treated with the fairness which is properly due to the subject.

It cannot be admitted that a given increase of the force in commission will require the number of officers now in the service to be increased in the same ratio. The number now employed in Navy Yards and on services of all kinds on shore, would require very little increase, however much the eruizing force might be enlarged. By excluding these, and applying the ratio of increase to those only which are required for the vessels now employed, his number of Captains for a fourfold inerease will be diminished from 112 to 55, and from 92 to 50 Commanders.

In his estimates for the future wants of the service, it is generally assumed that our vessels actually require the full number of officers which have been assigned to them since 1815. It is generally understood however, that as many officers have been put in vessels as could conveniently be accommodated, without regard to the numbers necessary to perform the duties, for the laudable purpose of extending the means of improvement to the officers as far as practicable with the force actually employed. The numbers in some of the classes might be reduced without injury.

Required-84 Captains, 84 Commanders, 534 Lieuts. 174 Masters, 1322 Midshipmen.

Now in service-55 Captains, 55 Commanders,

290 Lieuts., 28 Masters, 450 Mipshipmen. Deficient-29 Captains, 29 Commanders.

244 Lieuts., 146 Masters, 872 Midshipmen.

By the above statement it appears that, for a force carrying eight times the number of guns and five times the number of men now employed, the whole number of promotions from the Midshipmen upwards, would amount to 302, if the Masters are excluded, and they could be readily and perhaps better supplied from the Merchant service. To supply these 302 vacancies, there are now 195 Passed Midshipmen, or if all were required to be filled now, there would be a deficiency of about one hundred. The Midshipmen could be supplied from among the 4000 applicants, said to be on the list.

Although this view shows that the deficiency has been overrated by "Harry Bluff," there can be little doubt that the employment of a larger Naval force in active service would not only improve the qualifications of the officers we now have, but would be the best mode of supplying deficiencies. Another advantage in a gradual enlargement of this kind of force, would be found in allowing an increase of the average number of seamen employed in the Navy, without interfering materially with the supply for the merchant service; and consequently requiring a smaller proportion The true basis of all calculations and estimates from that service to give the Navy any particular for the extent of our Naval force seems to be the extension. In a time of peace, when the employnumber of seamen whom we could probably obtain ment of the Naval force would have reference during a state of war with a formidable Naval principally to these objects, its extent must probaenemy. In such a war, the commerce of the coun- bly continue to depend on the extent of our revetry would naturally be so much crippled, that we nue and the relative claims of other national obmight reasonably expect to command from thirty jects upon it. to thirty-five thousand men. The most advantageous proportion of vessels of different classes for the employment of these men, would depend upon eircumstances not easily to be foreseen; but upon be contemplated. At the same time he admits this classification and relative number of vessels, would depend, in some considerable degree, the number of officers necessary for the service; because the proportion between the officers and crews varies in the different classes of vessels.- The correctness of his rule is not admitted; nor [See Note G]. is it perceived how his references to the Army or In some of the communications to Congress on to the ships will sustain it. His rule supposes all subjects connected with the Navy, it has been sug- the officers to be provided, which the contemplagested that about 20 ships of the line, 20 frigates, ted number of vessels would require. As a neces25 steamers, 25 sloops and as many smaller vessary consequence, no other promotions would be

It is assumed in the essays that the only rule by which the proper number of officers can be determined, is by providing for all the vessels which may

this rule would give more than would be required for a time of peace, but asks-" Is not this the case with the Army? Is it not the case with the ships themselves?"

As this is an evil which vitally affects the interests and efficiency of the Navy, the best exertions of all its friends may be well employed in devising some remedy [See Note I] which may be efficient, and yet conciliate in some degree the conflicting claims of national and individual interests.

necessary than to fill vacancies. These vacancies, further remedy, the evil would only be increased upon a mean of several years, have not exceeded and extended. three and a half per cent. of the numbers in service. Let it be supposed that the numbers which were estimated on a former page to ascertain present deficiencies, were now to be filled up, as the basis for future action. To prevent any complaint of unfairness, let it be assumed, that, instead of the average annual loss of three and a half per cent. Promotion by seniority has been the general rule there will be four per cent. in the Midshipmen, five in our Navy. Exceptions have only been made in the Lieutenants, seven in the Commanders, and for some special cause. This course secures to eight in the Captains;-the whole number, exclu- each officer, (against whose promotion some well sive of Masters, being about 2000. The annual established objection does not exist,) progressive vacancies in the class of Midshipmen would then advancement, uninfluenced by the partialities or be 84, of which 40 might be promotions, and their the prejudices of his superiors. Favoritism, unaverage length of service would be nearly 24 due or improper influence, are excluded, and as far years. The vacancies among the Lieutenants as seems to be practicable, the interests of the inwould be about 40,-12 by promotion,-length of dividual are secured. But if these are its advanservice about 13 years:-vacancies among Commanders about 13,-by promotion 7,—and their length of service about 14 years more. Thus the chances for the advancement of a Midshipman entering at 14 years of age [See Note H] would be, that he might be a Lieutenant at 38, Commander at 51, and Captain at 65 years of age.

Although the foregoing estimate is not proposed as minutely accurate, yet it is believed to present a fair general view of probable results with the assumed numbers of officers, if promotions should be made by seniority. It seems evident therefore, that the adoption of the rule proposed, though it might remove for the moment and to a slight extent some of the present evils of which complaint is made, would only lay the foundation for their greater extension hereafter. Promotions would be still slower than at present, and the inevitable consequence would be, that instead of the present 220 "discontented spirits, we should soon have others, worse and more injurious than the first, sowing broad-cast the seeds of discord and insubordination among all grades."

tages, the disadvantages are great also. It has already been shown that unless those proportions in the different grades which the ordinary duties of the service require, are entirely disregarded, the chances for promotion to any officer cannot occur when he is best qualified to receive it in fact, in most cases, not until he has passed the age when he can perform them with pleasure to himself or much advantage to the country. Depending alone on mere seniority, all the most powerful inducements for exertion are destroyed, and even the best of the officers will naturally be discouraged from making the necessary exertions to acquire high professional attainments. They naturally ask themselves, "wherefore should we seek active and arduous services, endure privations or hardships, or even seek to increase our professional knowledge, when our utmost exertions will neither hasten our own advancement, nor give us any preference over those, who merely take care to do just so much, and no more than will secure their continuance in service?" Can any system be devised, which would so completely destroy the

blight the energies of its officers, as this of promotion by seniority, coupled with the necessary relative proportions of the different grades of officers?

The only means proposed in the essays of pre-efficiency of the Navy, deaden the exertions and venting this great evil, (which from past experience may well be considered of the gravest character,) is, that only so many Midshipmen shall be annually appointed as may be sufficient to fill va- Favoritism to some, injustice to other individucancies, and if any excess of Passed Midshipmen als, might and undoubtedly would occur, under a should accidentally occur, the surplus should be system which should recognize the principle of encouraged to seek employment in the merchant general or partial selection; but even with these service to be recalled, if they should afterwards occasional and partial evils, would not such a sysbe required. Is it not apparent that neither of tem, under certain restrictions and modifications, these can remedy or reach the disease? The mis- be far preferable to promotion by seniority alone, chief would proceed not only from any excess of not only for the country, but the mass of the offiappointments to Midshipmen, but would be inherent cers themselves? If it were adopted, and its pracin the relative numbers previously established for tice made to depend upon presumed or alleged each grade. They would not, and in fact cannot, claims to superior qualifications or greater services, be made to bear such proportions to each other, as and guarded in the Senate by proper inquiry into will admit of promotions by seniority at the ages causes of preference or neglect, there seems to be which the interests of the country or due encour- little ground for apprehending many confirmations agement to the officers, require. Without some which the Navy generally would find cause to cen

The delay in the promotion of Passed Midship

sure. The belief that greater zeal, superior professional qualifications and greater services might men and Passed Assistant Surgeons is made the possibly, if not certainly, gain advancement over subject of special complaint in the essays of “ Harthe incompetent, the negligent and the indolent, ry Bluff." Although the remarks already made would, it is believed, infuse a spirit into the service, may apply generally to these, as well as to others, the beneficial effects of which would soon be appa- it may not be amiss to examine whether these rent to the country. classes of officers have any superior claims over This principle of selection is universally adopted others. Passed Midshipmen had no distinct rank in the British Navy, without other limitation than until 1826, nor Passed Assistant Surgeons until Executive discretion, up to the rank of Captain 1828. Previous to these periods, they stood on inclusive. Above that rank, the claims of seni- the same level, as to rank and compensation, with ority prevail, with few exceptions. As the number those who had belonged to the Navy but for a day. of officers in the respective ranks is not limited by All that they could gain by proving themselves any regulation, the consequence is, that a sufficient qualified for higher duties, was a preference in case number of competent officers and of the proper promotions should be required, but it gave them no ages, can be placed in all the ranks, while those other claim to earlier promotion than they poswho are not considered worthy of further promo- sessed before. tion remain in their respective grades for life.

In France, the number of officers in each grade is determined by royal ordinances, and may be varied at the royal pleasure. Promotions from Midshipmen are made by their standing on the list after examination; in the two next ranks (or up to what is equivalent to Commander in our service,) a certain proportion are promoted by seniority, and others by selection; above the rank of Commander, by selection entirely. As, with their established numbers, the vacancies, even when supplied in this manner, would not furnish the required numbers at the proper ages, they have adopted a further means for securing this object. The government grants to each officer the privilege of claiming, and reserves to itself the right of requiring him, to retire from the list of officers for active service, after he shall have been in the Navy twenty years. Although this privilege and right frequently remain unexercised with some individuals, yet it affords the means, which are not neglected, of removing the indifferent, and supplying their places on the active list with those deemed more competent; and thus their list is kept filled with efficient officers. A compensation during life is given to the officers thus removed, and is gradnated upon the pay of the rank from which they retire, and according to the whole length of their service in the Navy.

Believing that some distinction was due where the qualifications and length of service were so different, the President, in 1826, in virtue of authority vested in him by law, increased the pay of the Passed Midshipmen, gave them a rank over those who had not passed, and assigned them a distinction in dress. From the same motives, Congress regulated by law the compensation and standing of Passed Assistant Surgeons, but in neither case was any encouragement given, to justify an expectation of earlier promotion. These arrangements were considered at the time, as benefits conferred, not as injuries inflicted, [See Note J] and these officers were supposed to have been advanced, not as having been placed upon a retired list. When it is borne in mind that promotions must necessarily depend on vacancies, until the numbers in the higher grades are increased,-what possible cause of complaint can be urged, while the claims of the candidates have been distinctly recognized and their relative rank and compensation increased, during the time they are waiting for vacancies to occur? Are they not in every respect more favorably situated, than if they had been left in their original positions? If there is any just cause of complaint, it must be that the whole number of Midshipmen and Assistant Surgeons is too large. That such is not the opinion of the author of the essays, may be inferred, for he alleges it is insufficient to meet the increased demand which would exist, were the number of superior officers to be increased to the extent which he considers as indispensable. C. S.

EDITORIAL NOTES.

These statements of the plans pursued by the two nations with whose arrangements we are most conversant, and who at this time have the most powerful Naval forces in Europe, are made, that the attention of the Navy and the country may be directed to a consideration of the expediency of selecting any of their details, should the general [A] Well founded. Does C. S. think proper protecprinciple of selection be in any manner counte-tion has been given to our commerce on the coast of Africa? nanced. It is admitted, that the principle of selec- If so, whence these frequent arrivals of American vessels tion is liable to objections which may be conclu- in charge of English prize-masters-the recent practice sive with some, but those which experience has on the part of British cruisers, of searching and seizing demonstrated to be inevitable American vessels, and of interrupting them in their lawful upon the continuance pursuits? of promotion by seniority, will, it is hoped, secure a fair comparison and lead to a judicious decision.

[B] Respected accordingly. Why then have we any squadrons at all? If it be true that "with civilized nations, moral

force is as powerful and more appropriate than physical," | C. S. would have it, 1300 for the whole Navy. If the why not replace our squadrons in the Mediterranean, and French officers can attend properly to all the details of on the coasts of South America, with a gun-boat? The duty on board their men-of-war, without any Midshipmen Commander of a gun-boat could protest as earnestly as the at all, surely C. S. will admit that the officers in our Navy commander of a frigate or a 74," against a meditated wrong." can carry on the details of duty as well, in their ships, with [C] A pledge to the world that 400,000 men. Are we in the assistance of 5 or 6 Midshipmen in each. a condition to give any such pledge? On the Atlantic seaboard, from Maine to Georgia, we have but little more than one whole company of Regulars. In all the distance from the St. John's to the Sabine, we have not one fort that is garrisoned-nor guns enough, with perhaps the exception at Old Point, to make a battery for them. And most of the guns that are at these forts are laying on the ground for the want of carriages to mount them on. Cannons too without carriages, are as useless as muskets without stocks. So far then, from being in a condition like Austria, with her "400,000 men, to give a pledge to the world, that we are ready at home to act;" our exposed and defenceless state is considered by foreign nations rather as an invitation to, than as a warning against, aggression. That it is so considered by England, we need only to instance her conduct in the Caroline affair, her pretensions to the territory of Maine, and the searches and seizures of American vessels now continually made on the high seas by her men-of-war.

[D] Those means which the government has thought proper to employ. We know not what they are. But if the interest of American commerce required the presence of a Naval force in the China seas up to August 1839-(when the difficulties of the opium question commenced)—and again in April or May '41 (about the time the two ships now on their way, will arrive there,) when those difficulties will probably have been adjusted, surely the presence of a Naval force during the two years that intervened, and when those difficulties were at their height, would have proved highly beneficial.

[E] No existence except in his imagination. If C. S. will inquire of Commodore Warrington, who Harry Bluff says is one of the officers that got up and signed that petition, he will find perhaps that it is the imagination of some one else that is concerned in this matter.

[F] Confine him to his own ports. Among all the madhouse' schemes for spending the public money, we have never heard of one which contemplated a Navy large enough to confine to their own ports the ships of England, France or Russia-the only maritime nations from which we have any thing to dread.

[J] Benefits conferred, not as injuries inflicted. Benefits conferred on individuals certainly, but injuries inflicted on the public service. A sea-going friend who chances to be at our elbow likens the Navy, with its grade of Passed Midshipmen, to a private ship-owner who should establish a system of apprenticeship of his own for the purpose of furnishing his vessels with proper Mates and Captairs. But he commits the blunder of receiving apprentices three or four times as fast as his Mates and Captains die offconsequently when his apprentices become qualified for their higher duties, he calls them passed apprenticesdoubles their wages, and keeps them 6 or 8 years longer doing those duties which the apprentices proper can do as well. Though it is charitable to increase their pay, we cannot perceive how the interest of the public, any more than that of the private ship-owner, is advanced by supporting these passed cadets.

THE QUAKERESS:

A TALE IN ELEVEN CHAPTERS.

CHAPTER IX.

"Damsel, if the pity I feel for thee arise from any prac tice thine evil arts have made on me, great is thy guilt. But I rather judge it the kinder feelings of nature which grieves that so goodly a form should be a vessel of perdition. Lucas Beaumonoi.

A dilapidated antique building may still be seen where were held the trials of the New-England witches. It stands in the outskirts of the now somewhat celebrated town of S, where, even at this day, its grey gloomy walls, tottering old steeple and sombre appearance all remain as monuments of the superstition of that olden time; and these, by their solitude and desolation, all seem to say, those days are gone forever, and we, the relics of that dark [G] The proportion between the officers and crew varies. and ignorant period, are also fast passing away. Two hunTherefore, as Harry Bluff says, the number and size of the dred years ago that deserted pile presented a very different vessels afford the only rule by which the proper number of offi-scene. Early on the morning of what was expected to be cers can be determined. Scraps from the Lucky-Bag.-No. iv. p. 5 et passim.

[H] Fourteen years of age. Admitting the rate of promotion here assumed to be the true one; and, instead of C. S's. 1300 Midshipmen, adopting the plan proposed by Harry Bluff, of appointing only Midshipmen enough to fill up vacancies, and of promoting them as soon as qualified after 6 years of service-then, a Midshipman of 14 would be made a Lieutenant at 20, instead of at 38,--a Commander at 33, instead of at 51,-and a Post Captain at 47, instead

of at 65.

[I] Devising some remedy. This Harry Bluff has done in three words-regulate the supply by the demand. C. S. quotes usage in the French Navy. We are told it is not uncommon for French men-of-war to go to sea without any Midshipmen at all in them. If C. S. object to the school-ship plan, we cannot perceive why only the necessary supply of officers may not be obtained by reducing the number of Midshipmen in our ships to 5 or 6, if necessary, instead of having it as now does, frequently to reach 15 or 20, or, as

an eventful day, great numbers of people were seen burry. ing to the place of general convocation. As they eagerly prosecuted their course thitherward, and each anxious face spoke the importance of the occasion, it would have been difficult for a spectator to detect the various emotions and sentiments which were agitating the breasts of the multitude. But no mere spectator was there. Each countenance wore a common index of concern and interest. Here was seen a group whose sable garb and sacerdotal air bespoke, perhaps, the sacred office-there another, designated by their stern aspects and solemn deportments as the judges of the court-and yet another at no great distance, whose white locks and more reverend aspect, betokened their being the Patriarchs of the Colony. Also many of the more quiet and humble citizens, artisans and tillers of the soil, were seen earnestly pressing onward; honest laborers, who had suspended their business for the sake of witnessing that day's proceeding. Besides these, there were clus ters of garrulous old women, other companies of younger females, also children of both sexes, all excited and all