again. When the world shall have been again laid waste by conquerors, she will still continue to show mankind, not only the principle that ought to unite them, but, what is of no less importance, the form under which they ought to be united. And the philosopher, when he considers the constant fate of civil societies amongst men, and observes the numerous and powerful causes which seem, as it were, unavoidably to conduct them all to a state of political slavery, will take comfort in seeing that Liberty has at length disclosed her nature and genuine principles, and secured to herself an asylum, against despotism on one hand, and popular licentiousness on the other.*
* This work cannot be dismissed without praise by any editor who has a due sense of merit. The author, like an ingenious painter, sees the whole of his subject at one view; exhibits the prominent features in a strong light, without neglecting the inferior parts of the piece; observes the keeping and the perspective, and gives an interesting finish to the strokes of art. His colouring is, perhaps, too high: I do not mean that his style is brilliant; but his display is, in some respects, too flattering. Occasionally he seems to refine too much, in attributing to art and design what may in a great measure have arisen from chance. But this is the natural effect of that zeal for his subject, and of that respect for our ancestors, which he imbibed in the progress of his work.
AMERICAN Colonies, their claim of voting supplies to the
crown, hurtful, if obtained, to the English constitution,
443, 446. What ought to have been the general conduct
of ministers in regard to the colonies, 446, 447.
Appeal, in case of murder, its effects, and to whom allowed,
75.
Army, restrictions on the power of the king in regard to the
keeping of it, 75, 76. Is not, in England,
supporting the authority of the crown, 375.
assistance was useful to James II., 396.
Power and Crown.
the means of
How little its
See Military
Arrest, method of, in civil causes, by the English laws, 95,
96. By the Roman laws, 98, 99. The alterations in the
English law in that respect, 100.
Assemblies, popular, the disadvantages they lie under in re-
gard to each coming to any deliberate well-weighed reso-
lution, 212, 213. The advantages a few distinguished
citizens have over them, 217, 218. Tully's passage con-
cerning them, 227. See Commonwealths, People, Rome.
Athens, arbitrary proceedings of its magistrates, 234.
Aula Regis, what kind of Court, 13. The Court of Common
Pleas dismembered from it, 93. The Court of King's
Bench may be considered as the remains of it, 94.
Author, occasional personal remarks of his, 319, 359, 360,
374, 382, 383. His Memorials of Human Superstition
quoted, 434. His conversation with Dr. Franklin, 445.
Barons, originally in a great measure independent in France,
10, 11. No so in England, 12. Unite in a common cause
with the people, 19, 288, 385.
Beauchamp, lord (now marquis of Hertford), procures the
passing of a bill for limiting personal arrests, 100.
Bills, how deliberated upon and framed, 57, 193, 199, 228,
229. See Commons and Parliament.
Bill of Rights, an account of, 49. Utility of its provisions,
291.
Blackstone, judge, quoted, 58, 155, 307, 321.
Burnet, bishop, quoted, 311, 397.
Casar, public speech of his quoted, 324.
Censorial power, that established in Rome only a senatorial
artifice, 249. See Press.
Censors, in Rome, might remove a man from one tribe into
another, and elect senators, 236.
Chancery, court of, its office in regard to the framing of writs,
108, 109. See Equity, courts of.
Charles I., sketch of his reign, 40-44. Maintains his ground
eleven years against the violent political and religious
spirit of his times, 389. His attempt to seize the five
members led to the civil war, 391.
Charles II., conduct of, 45.
Charta, Magna, substance of, 23, 24.
Cicero quoted, 104, 120, 224, 227, 235, 301.
Civil English laws, divided into unwritten and written law,
90. The sources of the unwritten law, 91. How far the
civil law is a part of the same, 92. What the written law
is, 93. Peculiarities of the English civil laws, 95. Re-
finements and subtilties in them, 100, et seq. Compared
with the old Roman civil laws, 106.
Civil power in England, how superior to the military, 390,
391, 395.
Civil Roman laws, the constant dislike of the English law-
yers for them, 87, 88. Formalities in the ancient Roman
laws, 103, 104. The different collections of them, 126.
Coke, sir Edward, quoted, 150, 153, 193, 251.
Comines, Philip de, quoted, 33.
Commons, English, their origin, under Henry III. and Ed-
ward I., 26, 27. How inconsiderable their weight at first,
27. This soon increases, 28, 29. Farther advances, 34, 35.
How the house is constituted, 51. Vindicate the right of
taxation against the attempts of the crown, 38, 43. And
of the lords, 72. See Taxation. They cannot vote by
proxy, 193. Enjoy a freedom of debate superior to that
ever possessed by any popular assembly, 200. They are
debarred from any share in the executive authority, 240.
Are thence led to serve the people faithfully, 242. Strik-
ing instances of this in the laws they have framed at par-
ticular times, 289-291. And in their watching their
execution, 306–308. Have impeached the servants of
the crown and judges, 308. Their proceedings in the
case of sir John Coventry, 311. See Parliament and Re-
presentative. Abridge their own personal privileges, 314.
Do strict justice on their own members, 314. On what
occasion they repealed the statute De Hæretico Combu-
rendo, 326. Their attacks on the crown's prerogative
defeated by the lords, 334. They in their turn defeat the
like attempts from the lords, 335.
Commonwealths, the people in them apt to be misled by
favourite leaders, 169, 170. The division of the execu-
tive authority that takes place in them, makes it very dif
ficult to lay it under proper restraint, 170. The people
unavoidably betrayed by those whom they trust with
power, 232, 235, 237. Revolutions always concluded, in
them, in a manner disadvantageous to public liberty, 276,
277. See Revolutions. The laws to secure the liberty
of the citizens, besides being imperfect, are not even care-
fully executed, 292, et seq. Cannot subsist without cer-
tain arbitrary powers, contrary to the liberty of the citi
zens, 357. Do not admit the liberty of speaking and
writing, and, perhaps, cannot, 359. The power of the
government supposed by law to be unbounded, till stopped
by some positive regulation, 381. By what means com-
monwealths generally lose their liberties, 406. Great
difficulty for the people in them to preserve their rights,
406, 407. See Rome and Geneva.
Conquest, the, is the real æra of the formation of the present
English government, 6, 7.
Constitution, English, the æras of its formation, 6, 7, 33, 48,
70. Being different from that of all other free states, can-
not fall into ruin from the same causes, 401. Causes that
operate for its preservation, 409. Endangered by the offers
of Columbus to Henry VII., 414. Farther reasons of its
future preservation, 420. How it rises again, after being
in a manner overwhelmed, 420. Dangers to which it may
be exposed, 420, 421. In what circumstances it may be
looked upon as annihilated, 422. Meddling with it, upon
the score of improvement, may prove very dangerous ex-
periments, 398, 399, 429. See Crown. Would have been
altered by granting the Americans their claims, 446.
See Taxation. Seems to diffuse a spirit of order and
justice among the lower classes of people, 453. Such a
one wished for by the politicians of antiquity, 455.
Consols, the æra of their creation, and nature of their office,
277. Unrestrained power, 233, 293. See Rome.
Coronation oath, 77.
Coventry, sir John, his case, 311. Resentment of the com-
mons, and their bill, 311.
Courts of law, in England, their names and functions, 93-
95. Kept by parliament under strict rules, 318. The
great impartiality of their proceedings, 313, et seq. See
Laws and Jury.
Cromwell, his fruitless attempts to form a popular assembly
obedient to him, 365.
Crown, its power much superior in England after the Con-
quest to what it was in France, 12. The barons compelled
to unite with the commonalty, to restrain its power, 19.
Its present constitutional prerogative, 60. Restraints it
lies under, 63, 66. Totally dependent on the people for
its supplies, 63. Usefulness of its power in preventing
any citizen or popular leader from acquiring a degree of
power dangerous to public liberty, 174. Instances of it,
182. Is not to make open proposals to parliament for their
assent or dissent, 201. May send messages to each house,
and to what effect, 202. Unites in itself the whole execu-
tive authority, 240. Thereby produces a union in a
common cause among all orders of subjects, 243. Is like
an ever-subsisting Carthage, that maintains the virtue of the
representatives of the people, 245. Farther illustration of
the same fact, 302, 312. The power of Crowns has not
produced these effects in other countries, 328. Instances
of this, 329. The stability of the executive power of the
English crown, 331, is a great peculiarity of it, 334. Is
not a subject to be explained here otherwise than by facts,
333. Its power alternately defended by the two houses,
334. The secret forbearance of the two houses from in-
vading its prerogative, 338. Remarkable instances of
this, 341, 343, 344. Its secure power rendered con-
spicuous in the facility with which it dismisses great men
from their employments, 346. Not so in other monarchies,
347. The facility with which it dismisses the parliament,
349. Never attacked except by persons who positively
laid claim to it, or at least upon national grounds, 353.
Its power more secure in itself, but not so indelibly an-
nexed to the person of an individual as in other countries,
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