A treatise of human nature [by D. Hume].1817 |
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actions advantage agreeable approbation arises artificial attended beauty benevolence betwixt cause cerning character concerning connexion consent consider considerable contrary degree derived direct passions distinct double relation duce easily effect emotion encrease entirely esteem evil excite experience fancy farther feel force ginal give rise human nature imagination immediately impressions influence injustice interest ject judgment justice and injus kind latter laws lively colours love and hatred love or hatred mankind manner ments merit mind moral motive necessity never nexion object obligation observe operate original ourselves pain particular pathy person phænomenon philosophers pleasure possession present principle proceed produce promises propensity qualities racter reason reflection regard relation of ideas render rience rules satisfaction SECT sensation sense sensible sentiments shew sion society supposed sympathy tendency ther thing thought tice tion tis evident tis impossible transition tural twill uneasiness vice and virtue virtues and vices virtuous
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Сторінка 172 - I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not...
Сторінка 106 - Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.
Сторінка 171 - Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions, and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object.
Сторінка 367 - But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness.
Сторінка 107 - Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.
Сторінка 157 - Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be deriv'd from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already prov'd, can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.
Сторінка 237 - ... that they will not be wanting in theirs. All of them, by concert, enter into a scheme of actions, calculated for common benefit, and agree to be true to their word; nor is...
Сторінка 308 - We sympathize more with persons contiguous to us, than with persons remote from us : With our acquaintance, than with strangers : With our countrymen, than with foreigners. But notwithstanding this variation of our sympathy, we give the same approbation to the same moral qualities in China as in England.
Сторінка 171 - So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar'd to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind...
Сторінка 189 - Of all the animals, with which this globe is peopled, there is none towards whom nature seems, at first sight to have exercis'd more cruelty than towards man, in the numberless wants and necessities, with which she has loaded him, and in the slender means, which she affords to the relieving these necessities.