finally paid by the consumer, and generally in a manner that is very convenient to him. He pays them by little and little, as he has occasion to buy the goods. As he is at liberty, too, either to buy or not to buy, as he pleases, it must be his own fault if he ever suffers any considerable inconvenience from such taxes.

first of the four points, equality of taxation, requires to be more fully exa mined, being a thing often imperfectly understood, and on which many false notions have become to a certain de. gree accredited, through the absence of any definite principles of judgment in the popular mind.

§ 2. For what reason ought equality to be the rule in matters of taxation? For the reason, that it ought to be so in all affairs of government. Ав а government ought to make no distinction of persons or classes in the strength of their claims on it, whatever sacrifices it requires from them should be made to bear as nearly as possible with the same pressure upon all; which, it must be observed, is the mode by which least sacrifice is occa sioned on the whole. If any one bears less than his fair share of the burthen, some other person must suffer more than his share, and the alleviation to the one is not, on the average, so great a good to him, as the increased pressure upon the other is an evil.

"4. Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the state. A tax may either take out or keep out of the pockets of the people a great deal more than it brings into the public treasury, in the four following ways. First, the levying of it may require a great number of officers, whose salaries may eat up the greater part of the produce of the tax, and whose perquisites may impose another additional tax upon the people." Secondly, it divert may a portion of the labour and capital of the community from a more to a less productive employment. 'Thirdly, by the forfeitures and other penalties which those un-Equality of taxation, therefore, as a fortunate individuals incur who at maxim of politics, means equality of tempt unsuccessfully to evade the tax, sacrifice. It means apportioning the it may frequently ruin them, and there- contribution of each person towards by put an end to the benefit which the the expenses of government, so that community might have derived from he shall feel neither more nor less the employment of their capitals. An inconvenience from his share of the injudicious tax offers a great tempta- payment than every other person extion to smuggling. Fourthly, by sub-periences from his. This standard, jecting the people to the frequent visits and the odious examination of the tax

gatherers, it may expose them to much unnecessary trouble, vexation, and oppression:" to which may be added, that the restrictive regulations to which trades and manufactures are often subjected to prevent evasion of a tax, are not only in themselves troublesome and expensive, but often oppose insuperable obstacles to making improvements in the processes.

The last three of these four maxims require little other explanation or illustration than is contained in the passage itself. How far any given tax conforms to, or conflicts with them, is a matter to be considered in the discussion of particular taxes. But the

like other standards of perfection, cannot be completely realized; but the first object in every practical discussion should be to know what perfection is.

There are persons, however, who are not content with the general principles of justice as a basis to ground a rule of finance upon, but must have something, as they think, more specifically appropriate to the subject. What best pleases them is, to regard the taxes paid by each member of the community as an equivalent for value received, in the shape of service to himself; and they prefer to rest the justice of making each contribute in proportion to his means, upon the ground, that he who has twice as much property to be pro

from the protection of government, we should have to consider who would suffer most if that protection were withdrawn: to which question if any answer could be made, it must be, that those would suffer most who were weakest in mind or body, either by nature or by position. Indeed, such persons would almost infallibly be slaves. If there were any justice, therefore, in the theory of justice now under consideration, those who are least capable of helping or defending themselves, being those to whom the protection of government is the most indispensable, ought to pay the greatest share of its price: the reverse of the true idea of distributive justice, which consists not in imitating but in redressing the inequalities and wrongs of nature.

tected, receives, on an accurate calcu- | lation, twice as much protection, and ought, on the principles of bargain and sale, to pay twice as much for it. Since, however, the assumption that government exists solely for the protection of property, is not one to be deliberately adhered to; some consistent adherents of the quid pro quo principle go on to observe, that protection being required for person as well as property, and everybody's person receiving the same amount of protection, a poll-tax of a fixed sum per head is a proper equivalent for this part of the benefits of government, while the remaining part, protection to property, should be paid for in proportion to property. There is in this adjustment a false air of nice adaptation, very acceptable to some minds. But in the first place, it is not admissible that the protection of persons and that of property are the sole purposes of government. The ends of government are as comprehensive as those of the social union. They consist of all the good, and all the immunity from evil, which the existence of government can be made either directly or indirectly to bestow. In the second place, the practice of setting definite values on things essentially indefinite, and making them a ground of practical conclusions, is peculiarly fertile in false views of social questions. It cannot be admitted, that to be protected in the ownership of ten times as much property, is to be ten times as much protected. Neither can it be truly said that the protection of 1000l. a year costs the State ten times as much as that of 100l. a year, rather than twice as much, or exactly as much. The same judges, soldiers, sailors, who protect the one protect the other; and the larger income does not § 3. Setting out, then, from the necessarily, though it may sometimes, maxim that equal sacrifices ought to require even more policemen. Whether be demanded from all, we have next to the labour and expense of the protec- inquire whether this is in fact done, by tion, or the feelings of the protected making each contribute the same perperson, or any other definite thing becentage on his pecuniary means. Many made the standard, there is no such proportion as the one supposed, nor any other definable proportion. If we wanted to estimate the degrees of benefit which different persons derive

Government must be regarded as so pre-eminently a concern of all, that to determine who are most interested in it is of no real importance. If a person or class of persons receive so small a share of the benefit as makes it necessary to raise the question, there is something else than taxation which is amiss, and the thing to be done is to remedy the defect, instead of recognising it and making it a ground for demanding less taxes. As, in a case of voluntary subscription for a purpose in which all are interested, all are thought to have done their part fairly when each has contributed according to his means, that is, has made an equal sacrifice for the common object; in like manner should this be the principle of compulsory contributions and it is superfluous to look for a more ingenious or recondite ground to rest the principle upon.

:

persons maintain the negative, saying that a tenth part taken from a small incore is a heavier burthen than the same fraction deducted from one much larger: aud on this is grounded the

very popular scheme of what is called a graduated property-tax, viz. an income tax in which the percentage rises with the amount of the income.

This arrange.

to making it smaller ment however would constitute a reason, in addition to others which might be stated, for maintaining taxes On the best consideration I am able on articles of luxury consumed by the to give to this question, it appears to poor. The immunity extended to the me that the portion of truth which the income required for necessaries, should loctrine contains, arises principally depend on its being actually expended from the difference between a tax which for that purpose; and the poor who, can be saved from luxuries, and one not having more than enough for neceswhich trenches, in ever so small a de-saries, divert any part of it to indulgree, upon the necessaries of life. To gences, should like other people contake a thousand a year from the pos- tribute their quota out of those insessor of ten thousand, would not de- dulgences to the expenses of the prive him of anything really conducive state. either to the support or to the comfort The exemption in favour of the of existence; and if such would be the smaller incomes should not, I think, be effect of taking five pounds from one stretched further than to the amount whose income is fifty, the sacrifice re-of income needful for life, health, and quired from the last is not only greater immunity from bodily pain. If 50%. than, but entirely incommensurable year is sufficient (which may be with, that imposed upon the first. The doubted) for these purposes, an income mode of adjusting these inequalities of of 10. a year would, as it seems to pressure which seems to be the most me, obtain all the relief it is entitled equitable, is that recommended by to, compared with one of 1000Z., by Bentham, of leaving a certain mini- being taxed only on 50l. of its amount mum of income, sufficient to provide It may be said, indeed, that to take the necessaries of life, untaxed. Sup- 1007. from 1000l. (even giving back pose 50l. a year to be sufficient to pro- five pounds) is a heavier impost than vide the number of persons ordinarily 1000l. taken from 10,000l. (giving supported from a single income, with back the same five pounds). But this the requisites of life and health, and doctrine seems to me too disputable with protection against habitual bodily altogether, and even if true at all, not suffering, but not with any indulgence. true to a sufficient extent, to be made This then should be made the mini- the foundation of any rule of taxation. mum, and incomes exceeding it should Whether the person with 10,000l. a pay taxes not upon their whole amount, year cares less for 1000l. than the but upon the surplus. If the tax be person with only 1000l. a year cares ten per cent, an income of 60%. should for 100l., and if so, how much less, be considered as a net income of 10%., does not appear to me capable of being and charged with 17. a year, while an decided with the degree of certainty on income of 1000l. should be charged as which a legislator or a financier ought one of 950l. Each would then pay a to act. fixed proportion, not of his whole means, but of his superfluities.* An income not exceeding 50l. should not be taxed at all, either directly or by taxes on necessaries; for as by supposition this is the smallest income which labour ought to be able to command, the government ought not to be a party

Some indeed contend that the rule

of proportional taxation bears harder upon the moderate than upon the large incomes, because the same proportional payment has more tendency in the former case than in the latter, to reduce the payer to a lower grade of social rank. The fact appears to me more than questionable. But even admitting it, I object to its being considered incumbent on government to shape its course by such considerations, or to recognise the notion that social