meet the immediate and pressing exigency-the political pretensions and territorial usurpations of Mehemet Ali; and we appeal to the common sense of all mankind whether the terms of the agreement, or the state of affairs in which it was framed, admit of any other possible construction. France, therefore, not only acted with bad faith, but now endeavours to excuse herself by a miserable quibble.'

6

This is not merely our conjecture; nor has Lord Palmerston done more than civilly leave it to be inferred from the notorious facts; but it is the direct and honest assertion and charge against his own ministers, of a French gentleman of high rank, character, and talents-the Duke de Valmy, deputy of the Haute Garonne. He, even at the first outbreak, when all the rest of France appeared frenzied by the revolutionary press of M. Thiers, published his opinion on the question, which, with great good sense and candour, put the matter on its right footing, and with singular sagacity anticipated the assertions of Lord Palmerston and the admissions of M. Thiers in their subsequent communications. We shall extract a few passages from this remarkable paper, not only because it is ably executed, but because the evidence of such a man as M. de Valmy is in this case less liable to suspicion of bias than ours could be.

After stating the note of the 27th July, 1839, and the passages from the two royal speeches as given above, the Duke proceeds—

'Why do these declarations form the main prop of foreign cabinets ? Because they have always acted up and spoken to the like purport. Why do they show our weakness? Because we have not been faithful to our declarations, and at the present time they may be brought in evidence against us. I am aware that, following the example of the ministry of the 12th of May [M. Mole's], there is still a discussion upon the meaning of the word integrity.' But we can admit no quibbling to be resorted to respecting the fate of empires; and it would no doubt suffice to appeal to the good sense of Admiral Roussin [the ambassador who had signed the note], to be very soon convinced that he did not understand the integrity of the Ottoman empire' otherwise than the ambassadors with whom he signed the act of the 27th of July. In any case it cannot be supposed that a diplomatic note can be signed without previously being satisfied as to the meaning of the words conveyed in the said act.'

The Duke might have added, that the same word integrity was repeated in all the French diplomatic papers and, six months later, in the King's speech, without any attempt to give it any different or restricted meaning; and indeed the King's speech goes further to contradict M. Thiers' quibble, for it distinguishes between the present danger of the Sultan, and the ulterior danger to the integrity of the empire; but M. de Valmy then goes on

to

to explain the real cause of these attempts to quibble away plain words:

'The truth is, that, whilst our ambassador adhered to the declaration of the 27th of July, the policy of the French cabinet was turning round. Mehemet Ali, who knows the secrets of our civilization, and the influence of the press on the proceedings of the government, knew how to dazzle. and enchant the principal organs of public opinion, and, seconded by them, he brought the cabinet to espouse his pretensions on Syria, the Taurus, and the district of Adana. Admiral Roussin was recalled and sacrificed to the Pacha of Egypt, for having declared that the Pacha had outraged France, and that the first opportunity ought to be seized to punish his insolence, by depriving him, in concert with the other powers, of the provinces which he had conquered. This, we all remember, was followed by certain public manifestations in favour of the Pacha.'

The Duke then proceeds to show how the French ministry pursued the tortuous policy they had adopted, and his statements have been verified to the letter by M. Thiers' recent speeches :

'It was expected that the alliance which had been contracted for the last ten years with the cabinet of London, and the advantages which had resulted therefrom, would impose upon it a duty not to separate from us in the Oriental question. It was thought that it was only necessary to gain time in order to sow dissension in the Conference. It was with that view, as it has been avowed since, that M. Sebastiani sought the assistance of a Turkish plenipotentiary in London.

"Notwithstanding all those intrigues, unworthy of a great nation, the conference in London pursued the work which had been commenced by the note of the 27th of July; nor could it be otherwise. The powers, which, after mature deliberation, had taken as a basis of their compact the integrity of the Ottoman empire, could not consistently revoke such a determination. Such inconsistency could not be expected.' The Duke next shows that M. Thiers imagined that his professed addiction to what was called the English alliance' would enable him to obtain a further delay; and, with it, the further chance of sowing dissensions between the powers; and so confident, so presumptuous was he- so deceived,' the Duke de Valmy hints, by the reports of a secret agent who held language opposite to that of M. Guizot,'-that his official journal on the 13th July, only two days before the signature of the treaty, expressed 'the satisfaction of the French cabinet at the state of the Eastern negotiations.'

And here M. de Valmy indicates a small but very important stimulant of all the commotion that ensued-M. Thiers' amourpropre was hurt!

The President of the Council was completely astounded at such an unexpected coup de main, and replied by an appeal to arms!"

And

And then the Duke asks whether M. Thiers' call to arms was ' on his part a serious manifestation, having for object the defence of a national policy-an European interest in the Eastern question? or was it but a measure ab irato for the purpose of dissimulating a false position and a retrograde proceeding?'

And he goes on to prove that there is not a shadow of consistency or common sense in M. Thiers' professed policy as to the Eastthat, in fact, he had no policy at all (since clearly confirmed by his own speeches), and that the commotion he excited in France was a mixture of personal pique at his own failure and of party tactics to cover his retreat.

We hear of the enlightened times in which we live-of the torrents of light with which the press irradiates the public mind —and, above all, of the journalism which makes France one great école normale of political philosophy; but, alas! we defy the annals of ignorance to produce an instance of so general, so deep, and so utterly causeless a delusion as M. Thiers and his partisans lately spread over France—a delusion which we know not that any man in France except the Duke de Valmy, or any newspaper but the Presse, have ventured boldly and frankly to expose

of which, even such men as Lamartine and Guizot seem to think it prudent to raise the corners only by degrees, as light is admitted gradually and with precautions, into the cell of a convalescent maniac.

The first outcry was, that France was insulted, and that her honour required the reparation of blood. Lord Palmerstonand we applaud his conduct in this conjuncture; it was unusual, but it was prudent and dignified; a departure from diplomatic reserve and a concession to public feeling, which one who feels himself clearly in the right can afford to make-Lord Palmerston, we say, took an early opportunity of making a statement in parliament, so true, and yet so conciliatory, that, except by a few énergumènes, who are absolutely incurable, the charge of insult is, we believe, entirely abandoned. But then it was said that France was isolated-expelled-from the congress of nations. Lord Palmerston again destroyed that pretence: his memorandum of the 31st August showed that France was not expelled, but had, contrary to the wishes and earnest entreaties of her allies, withdrawn herself;-that if she was isolated, it was that, like a sulky child, she had put herself into a corner because her associates would not allow her to have everything her own way; and that, in fact, concessions had been offered in the desire of appeasing her waywardness, which we do not hesitate to say would, if adopted, have defeated the main object: in fact the real blame imputable to the allies was the strenuous humility with which they endeavoured

endeavoured to satisfy the caprices of one who had from the beginning resolved not to be satisfied.

This pretence, of France's having been offensively isolated, having also failed, some other must be looked for to justify all the recent indignation; for few were bold enough to confess, with the Duke of Valmy, that the said indignation was absolutely and entirely groundless. The third edition, then, of the grievance of France was, that the powers, on signing the treaty, without apprising her of the actual time and place of signature, and giving her a final option of acceding to it, had been guilty of a mauvais procédé -a want of courtesy. This is so mitigated, so small a charge, that in other circumstances it would be wholly unworthy of notice; but as it has become the concentrated essence of the French grievance, and as it has received the countenance of such a man as M. Guizot, who, infinitely to his honour, helped to dissipate the former delusions,-it may be proper to say a few words on a subject which has thus received an extrinsic import

ance.

In the first place, we are glad to see in this complaint an admission that the treaty of the 15th July is not only fair and proper in itself, but that it accords with the principles in which France had concurred in the earlier stage of the negotiations; for had it been otherwise, it would have been a 'très mauvais procédé'—in fact it would have been a direct insult-to have supposed that France, on such a sudden summons, would have signed a treaty repugnant to her feelings and contrary to her declared principles: when, therefore, she complains that the treaty was not offered to her acceptance, it is an admission that the treaty is such as the allies might reasonably have supposed she could have accepted with honour.

But if France should deny this inference, she makes her case still weaker; for would it not be a bien plus mauvais procédé' to have suddenly called her into the Conference, and said, Here is a treaty, in the preparation of which you declined to take any part. We have, in defiance of your objections, persisted in preparing it. You have been no party to the reasonings, discussions, mutual concessions, and amicable explanations, of which it is the result; but we are about to sign it; and we have sent for you to ask you—will you now sign it, without alteration or delay--yes or no?' France would have rejected with indignation so insolent a proposition; and we should have heard from her something more forcible, as well as more just, than a querulous complaint about 'mauvais procédés.'

But even if the four Powers could have imagined that such an option could at such a time have been made, by any forms,

palatable

palatable to France, there were other reasons connected with the success of the measure itself which would naturally have prevented it. France professed to have withdrawn herself from the affair out of regard to the interests of Mehemet Ali, whom she affected-on what pretence we know not-to take under her special protection; and can it be supposed that the Powers had not discovered the intrigues unworthy a great nation,' as M. de Valmy justly calls them, by which France had endeavoured to delay and embarrass the completion of the treaty? Could they be ignorant of M. Thiers' secret communications with Mehemet Ali? of his busy anxiety and unscrupulous efforts to defeat the object of the four Powers? Was it not clear that the success of the treaty would mainly depend on the celerity of its execution; and that prudence and humanity both required that Mehemet Ali should have as little opportunity as possible of making his resistance more desperate and calamitous? What would have been thought of the common sense, the sincerity of the allies, if they had communicated to France, one hour before it was necessary, information which she would have instantly conveyed to Mehemet Ali, and of which she would, no doubt, have availed herself in every possible way towards defeating the success of the treaty? Has not M. Thiers confessed that the moment he did hear of the treaty he employed the French telegraph to apprise Mehemet Ali? and did he not boast que par une heureuse circonstance le télégraphe avait sauvé la flotte du Pacha?'-(Speech 25th Nov.)-The boast, like others of M. Thiers' fanfarronnades, was unfounded; the French telegraph did not save the stolen fleet; but M. Thiers' attempt to defeat the allies is not the less indisputable. The four Powers seem to have shown great-too great-anxiety to satisfy even the unreasonable wishes of France; but that they should commit suicide to please M. Thiers was rather too much to expect. If Lord Palmerston can make as good a defence for the long delay in coming to this arrangement as he may for not having afforded France a new chance of defeating it, he will come out of the Eastern affair with more credit than he ever has out of any other.

As we have noticed this last charge chiefly out of respect to its having been produced by M. Guizot, and subsequently adopted-when he felt everything else slipping from under him— by M. Thiers, we beg leave to say that we do not measure M. Guizot by the scale of this moyen échappatoire, which is a mere flimsy pretence-not even a plausibility. M. Guizot is a man of genius, patriotism, and worth-but his situation is peculiarhe was ambassador; he could not in honour-which, after all,

VOL. LXVII. NO. CXXXIII.

U

is,